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The 2003 American invasion of Iraq resulted in a violent insurgency that American 
forces were initially unable to counter.  The United States military was shocked by its 
failure and was forced to consider what it had done wrong. Once the U.S. military 
looked into its past it was forced to admit it had wrongly ignored counterinsurgency.  
To correct this, it assigned many of its officers, along with other military experts, to 
create a new, updated doctrine that incorporated the lessons of Iraq and other recent, 
relevant historical precedent.   
 Perhaps surprisingly to some, the United States military interpreted that the 
Algerian War was of particularly important value.  This example, according to the 
interpretation of the U.S. military, demonstrated certain aspects of counterinsurgency, 
called “laws” by some in the military, that could benefit current world powers.  The two 
aspects of counterinsurgency the U.S. determined were especially important from the 
Algerian War are the primacy of the population—who must be genuinely convinced to 
participate on the side of the counterinsurgent force—above all else, including the 
destruction of the insurgent force and the necessity of the counterinsurgent force to only 
use methods that are consisted with its stated national ideals. 
 Specifically, the French won the war militarily but still lost politically.  This 
represents an extremely important conclusion for the U.S. military as it has had a 
history—as in Vietnam—of considering military victory to be the core of its strategy.  
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The Algerian War, according to the American interpretation, was strong evidence that 
the old way of thinking was no longer possible.  Therefore, the U.S. military studied the 
Algerian War and this “lesson” has been directly applied to its current 
counterinsurgency doctrine.  Also, the French use of torture represented another lesson 
that was particular to the Algerian War.  The use of torture in France was of particular 
interest to the Americans because while it appeared to be working during the Algerian 
War, the U.S. military interpreted that its success was only a facade.  The conspicuous 
use of torture had undermined French prestige both inside Algeria and around the 
world.  Therefore, even though torture yielded positive, short-term results the long-term 
result was political failure as France discontinued its effort to retain Algeria.  Both of 
these lessons appear in the current counterinsurgency field manual of the U.S. military, 
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ALGERIA: INTRODUCTION TO AN IMPORTANT CASE STUDY 
 The history of modern counterinsurgency is problematic because it is marked by 
uneven progress, and its progression is even repeatedly reversed.  Some countries, like 
the United States, have simply ignored their own lessons, not to mention the examples 
of others.  Even the military maxim “generals always seem to fight the last war” 
criticizes a tendency in conventional warfare that is far less counterproductive than the 
attitude with which the United States has approached counterinsurgency throughout its 
history.  This relatively uninterested or resistant approach to counterinsurgency has left 
the United States military unprepared for the 21st Century insurgencies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.   
 However, the initial lack of success in both these recent counterinsurgencies has 
recently induced American political and military leaders to scramble to improve U.S. 
proficiency in such operations, as it has in several other wars.  While the United States 
has its own historical examples from which to derive lessons, such lessons are not 
exhaustive.  Even though past American counterinsurgency operations may be the 
easiest for American strategists to study, the Pentagon has paid close attention to other 
foreign examples.  At the dawn of the 21st Century one example, the Algerian War, 
dramatically increased in importance to the American military because it has certain 
elements lacking in virtually all others.   Because of these special elements the Algerian 
War represents a case study of special value to modern counterinsurgency strategists.  
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The Algerian War provides its scholars with lessons of two types, precedent to be 
repeated and those to be avoided at all costs.   But what is perhaps most telling about the 
Algerian War, in the context of the lessons it can provide, is that the French succeeded 
militarily, but lost the war.  This fact leaves many orthodox military thinkers scratching 
their heads.  It traditionally has been thought, as this thesis will show, that winning 
militarily was winning the war.   
 Insurgency is defined by the American army as, “...an organized movement 
aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and 
armed conflict.”1  So the definition of counterinsurgency follows: “... All political, 
economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions that can be taken by a 
government to defeat an insurgency.”2  As this definition suggests, counterinsurgency 
represents a multifaceted problem for countries and their militaries.  History has 
demonstrated the consequences for those countries that approach counterinsurgency 
and ignore this essential fact.  The lessons from Algeria, as the writings of American 
military thinkers and official military publications have confirmed, have significantly 
contributed to the modern understanding of counterinsurgency. 
 The nature of counterinsurgency, unlike that of conventional warfare, demands 
political victory as the end, and military operations as the means.  In this context, the 
Algerian War represents a superior historical example as, while the French rendered 
                                                 
1 Tactics in Counterinsurgency. Headquarters: Department of the Army. April, 2009. pg. 1-1 
2 Ibid. pg. 1-2 
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their opposition largely militarily ineffective, they still lost the “war,” that is, they failed 
to end the insurgency.  This thesis will demonstrate both how the Algerian War has 
received the serious attention of top military thinkers despite the tortuous and, at times,  
stagnant history of American counterinsurgency doctrine, and the special importance of 
the French example that demonstrates that military victory alone will not end an 
insurgency, thereby representing a special link between the Algerian War and the 
history of American counterinsurgency doctrine.   
 Over the last quarter of the 20th Century and right up until the 2003 Iraq War, the 
French war in Algeria has not been a popular topic in the United States.  In terms of its 
military history, the United States has had an abundance of its own examples, like 
Vietnam and the Philippine Insurrection, which have served as the main sources of 
discussions involving lessons of the past.  Furthermore, only limited intellectual energy 
has been devoted to a detailed exploration of the application of foreign lessons in 
counterinsurgency warfare.  However, even though the American general public has 
paid little attention to the Algerian War, its significance to modern U.S. military 
counterinsurgency doctrine has been surprisingly significant.  Following the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003, American policy-makers were faced with an extremely violent insurgency.  
The sudden demand for the U.S. military to confront this problem sparked an abrupt 
scramble for ideas to counter the Iraq insurgency.  One obvious choice, for reasons this 
thesis intends to make clear, was the Algerian War.  Even within the military, there are 
extremely few American-authored sources dealing with the Algerian War during the 
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1970s, 80s or 90s, and even fewer including the topic of counterinsurgency.  Therefore, 
this once relatively obscure politico-military event, during the last quarter of the 20th 
Century within the United States, has since heavily impacted American foreign policy.3   
 The Algerian War, as it is commonly called, lasted from 1954 to 1962.  When the 
Algerians revolted, the French initially responded with police and, later, military 
measures in an attempt to hold on to Algeria at nearly all costs.  By the end of the war, 
17,456 French soldiers had lost their lives, either killed in action or from “accidents,” and 
64,985 had been wounded, while the number of Algerian deaths was likely around 
300,000.4  However, the Algerian insurgency eventually achieved its primary goal 
despite its ostensible military defeat by the French army, and France, led by Charles de 
Gaulle, was compelled to recognize full Algerian independence in 1962.  France's 
eventual failure to retain Algeria despite several well-reasoned and successful practices 
it employed is the reason the example of the French counterinsurgency holds many 
lessons for the present and its study has been influential to today’s counterinsurgency 
strategists and policy makers who face similar, if not identical, situations.   
 The uprising in the former French colony serves as a lasting lesson about what is 
effective and ineffective as a means to defeat an insurgency and restore the desired 
political status quo, or to establish a new one.  Moreover, the operational lessons learned 
                                                 
3 This is justified by the small number of articles devoted to the Algerian War written in the context of the 
U.S. “War on Terror.” 
4 Alistair Horne. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. United States of America: History Book Club 




from France’s experience in Algeria are accompanied by important political lessons and 
universal ethical questions, regarding in particular, cultural imperialism and the 
legitimacy of torture.  These aspects of the history of the Algerian War reveal lessons 
that have been applicable ever since.  It is not the aim of this thesis to judge the French; 
however, the task of evaluating the lessons of the Algerian War, and their implications 
for American counterinsurgency doctrine, necessarily involves a highlighting of French 
errors over those of the insurgents.  The object of this thesis, therefore, is to explore the 
legacy of the Algerian War, specifically how it has since influenced the theory and 
application of American counterinsurgency doctrine. 
 Current world powers, the United States, Great Britain, and Russia, invest a great 
deal of their resources in counterinsurgency operations, whether these take the form of 
highly-trained human intelligence, expensive surveillance equipment, or large 
appropriations.5  This is because counterinsurgency is a crucial topic to modern warfare 
and thus a crucial part of the foreign policy of many of the world's most powerful states.  
Since World War Two, which is the last example of a large scale, total war directly 
between world powers, the world has experienced a series of “irregular” wars.  The 
term “irregular” war simply refers to any war that does not easily fit the description of a 
conventional war.  Conventional wars feature opposing state actors that fight each other 
using “regular” armies and naval forces in such a way that reflects an adherence to 
                                                 
5 David Ucko. “Innovation or Inertia: The U.S. Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency” Orbis. 
Spring, 2008 p. 291 
6 
 
regulations and accepted tradition.  Therefore, “irregular” warfare denotes any conflict 
that is not conventional.  The Iraq War, the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, and the 
Vietnam War are the most salient examples of “irregular” wars fought by the United 
States in recent decades.   
 The practical need for academic scholarship on counterinsurgency is  
heightened by the observed lack of success that large nations, especially those which are 
democracies and therefore rely on public support, have experienced when attempting  
to stop insurgencies.  The primary objective of every counterinsurgency is political in 
nature, which explains why military superiority, being logically necessary in 
asymmetrical warfare, does not automatically bring with it “real success” in these 
conflicts.  Real success is only achieved with the establishment of long-term political 
control of a given area by the counterinsurgency force.  Thus, a military victory alone 
cannot achieve meaningful results.  Rather, such victories have been necessary for 
clearing a path for subsequent political success by removing violent opposition.   
 Nevertheless, conventional military operations have received the bulk of the 
attention and implementation, making successful counterinsurgencies significantly more 
difficult.  So, then, counterinsurgency represents a puzzle that conventionally proficient 
forces have not yet completely solved.  The combination of the intrinsic difficulties of 
counterinsurgency operations and the modern trend of nation-building to establish 
liberal governments (which often involves such operations) necessitates serious 
attention and thorough study of specific historical cases.  This view is shared by the U.S. 
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military.  Austin Long, writing a report for the Secretary of Defense in 2006, described 
his work the following way:  
This study is premised on the assertion that Iraq and Afghanistan (the 
two contemporary counterinsurgencies of the day) are consonant with 
some general characteristics of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and 
are more similar to than different from many previous insurgencies.6   
 
The United States has taken notice over the last decade and has paid careful attention to 
the historical analysis of this component of its geopolitical grand strategy. 
 One of the most salient examples of counterinsurgency is the Algerian War of 
1954-1962.  This violent confrontation between France and Algerian separatists for 
political control of the massive North African territory left a legacy of considerable value 
to policy-makers and counterinsurgency strategists the world over. The American 
military in particular has drawn lessons from the experience of the French.  American 
military strategists have interpreted that analysis of the Algerian War demonstrates the 
proper and improper methods of conducting counterinsurgency operations, in 
particular the political and moral perceptions of a target population, as well as the 
necessity of clear, realistic objectives accompanied by a strict adherence to 
internationally acceptable methods. The latter is a particularly touchy matter since the 
insurgents often do not play by the rules of conventional warfare.  The participants in 
this war, especially the English-speaking French officer David Galula, whose works will 
                                                 
6 Austin Long. On “Other War:” Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research. p. 15 
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be discussed in much greater detail later, have offered a large volume of anecdotal, 
doctrinal, and theoretical contributions to the field.  
 The Pentagon in 2003 showed the film, The Battle of Algiers, which is a 
documentary-style portrayal of the climax of the Algerian War illustrating the 
operational achievements by the French.  As will be evidenced in later chapters, the 
Pentagon itself eventually realized the striking similarities between the events detailed 
in of the film and the American shock at the Iraqi insurgency following Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  The Pentagon's perception of the importance of the legacy of the Algerian 
War, as this thesis will argue, indicates the Algerian War's influence on American 
military thinkers.  The lessons of the war found in the film were that counterinsurgency 
is primarily a political endeavor and that the military component must be measured 
ultimately by its political affects.  The subsequent historical application of such lessons, 
in whatever ways they have been understood and adopted, makes the Algerian War 
especially important, not just in French or colonial history but for the public policy of 
states that find themselves in similar circumstances.  
 While some may contend that the Algerian War is not a viable comparative 
example because colonial wars are now an extinct endeavor as classic colonial empires 
have receded or disappeared, many of the elements of colonial war still relate directly to 
conflicts today that involve counterinsurgency.  Even though not altogether appreciated 
by the French at the time, colonialism during the 1950s and 1960s, was an endangered 
enterprise.  Even though the French government and many of its people failed to detect 
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it, the international community's tolerance for any state policy reflecting the then-
progressively unpopular “White Man’s Burden” had significantly declined.  The fact 
that the Algerian War was a colonial war meant that it encroached upon the acceptable 
assumptions of the international community, which all democracies must contend with 
when fighting any war.  Paris failed to reconcile its differences with the international 
community, thus putting itself in an awkward position between internal and external 
demands.  While such a conclusion is clearer with hindsight, the failure of policy makers 
to imagine the results of their country's actions or to heed international opinion once it 
soured against France exacerbated their international condemnation, serving as a 
roadblock to political success.  The role of international opinion in the Algerian War is 
evidenced in the nature of its end, as the war damaged France domestically and nearly 
brought the country to civil war, despite the army’s significant operational successes in 
Algeria.  Thus, although colonial wars are outside the realm of current international 
policy-making, valuable lessons can still be derived from certain elements of them.         
   In all historical writing, great caution must be exercised in extracting “lessons” 
from the past, as no two situations are ever exactly the same.  Each moment in history is 
necessarily different from every other.  Therefore, when evaluating the worth of 
historical lessons, it must be remembered that such an undertaking is an inexact science, 
requiring subjective thinking rooted in knowledge of historical precedent and critical 
analysis.  In other words, while rigid transpositions of historical scenarios are 
misleading, certain common elements of historical events, whether doctrinal or 
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theoretical, can be extracted, analyzed and cautiously utilized in the development and 
execution of strategies and policies.  To use the lessons of history effectively, one must 
walk a tightrope between over-transposition and ignorance.  By itself, knowledge of 
history is not particularly helpful with regard to policy-making.  Analysis and deduction 
from history with regard to its important and causally relevant elements requires great 
circumspection.  Analysis of history for the purpose of practical application of its lessons 
is, therefore, more of an art than a science. 
 For students of the Algerian War in particular the process of extracting lessons 
must be done with caution.  As mentioned above, a colonial war is very different from 
the wars that the United States currently prosecutes.  It is not the purpose of this thesis 
to label the current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan as “colonial” in nature.  Rather, the 
point is to compare the similar and relevant elements found within each war that are 
useful in improving policy and provide strategies to move forward.  As the 2006 report 
prepared for the U.S. Secretary of Defense referenced earlier put it, “while many specific 
details [of Cold-War era counterinsurgencies] do indeed vary greatly, [from post Cold 
War examples] insurgency and counterinsurgency is [sic] a more general phenomenon 
that is not a product of... peculiarities.”7  While discretion must thus be exercised by 
those evaluating the lessons of the Algerian War for practical application in 
counterinsurgency doctrine, this does not make such an endeavor worthless.  Also, it is 
not the central purpose of this thesis to provide an independent evaluation of the 
                                                 
7 Long. p. x 
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Algerian War with respect to potential lessons for subsequent policy-makers.  This thesis 
will look at the Algerian War mostly through the lens of military experts and policy 
analysts by focusing on the lessons they interpreted and will evaluate their applicability 
to counterinsurgency doctrine. 
 Much of what has been written about the Algerian War is monographic and 
focused chronologically on the events that took place.  Since this thesis is concerned with 
the overall lessons of the war and their application, such works are useful to cite details 
for the purpose of comparison.  Several works written during the last years of the war 
will serve as sources as they provide a valuable perspective into the contemporary 
perceptions of the war.  The vast majority of historical literature written on the 
“memory” of the Algerian War deals with cultural or political phenomena, not the 
military aspects of the war.  A prime example of this is Todd Shepard’s The Invention of 
Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France, which deals with the lasting 
effects of France’s defeat in Algeria, and the cultural and philosophical impact the war 
has had on the traditional notion of French universalism.  Also, works like Paris 1961: 
Algerians, State Terror, and Memory, co-authored by Jim House and Neil Macmaster, 
examine the French government’s reaction to domestic unrest and active dissent on 
behalf of the Algerian revolutionaries and the sometimes brutal repercussions that 
reaction had on French citizens and Algerians.  In terms of diplomatic history, Matthew 
Connelly’s work, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins 
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of the Post-Cold War Era, focuses on the diplomatic repercussions of the Algerian War, 
and, in particular on the relationship of France and the United States.  
 While most of the historical scholarship on the after-effects of the Algerian War 
deals with culture and diplomacy, there are several reports written by and for the 
military, whose objective is to derive useful strategic and tactical lessons from the 
Algerian War. David Galula, a French military officer who actually participated in the 
French counterinsurgency operation in Algeria as a commander of a company sized 
pacification unit, has written a number of articles, books, and reports on the subject.  His 
works are crucial to this thesis, as he is essentially the face of the military side of the 
Algerian War’s legacy for the American military men and women who have studied the 
war.  Several reports, written by military officers for their respective war colleges, 
discuss Galula’s experience and doctrines and thus serve to causally bind the Algerian 
War and U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine.  Several political scientists and military 
personnel have written reports for the same purpose.     
 Even though there exists a plethora of books, articles, reports and speeches 
dedicated to Algeria, counterinsurgency, and the marriage of both, there is a dearth of 
works which consider the lessons learned about counterinsurgency from the Algerian 
War.  Therefore, this thesis is advancing into relatively uncharted territory.  In order to 
effectively outline the effect the Algerian War has had on counterinsurgency doctrine 
this thesis will begin with a survey of basic elements of Algerian history relevant to the 
eventual uprising.  Part of Chapter 4 will deal specifically with Gillo Pontecorvo’s film, 
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Battle of Algiers (1964).  This film is extremely useful as it highlights many of the most 
important aspects of the war, and is the source that subsequent generations, including 
military officials, have used to understand the war.  For many it is their total knowledge 
of the Algerian conflict.  However, lessons from the film represent only a small part of 
the range of lessons derived from the Algerian War.  The political and military lessons 
derived from the conflict will be given separate attention, each with its own chapter, 
because of the importance of understanding the different nature of each.  Finally, crucial 
to the outcome of the war and its effect on counterinsurgency doctrine since, is a 
discussion of the issues of torture and the “acceptable” means of warfare.  These issues 
make the Algerian War a classic example of the importance of rules of engagement for a 
democratic nation in the modern era. Bringing these things all together should bring 
about a clear understanding of the relevance of the French experience in Algeria in 












THE SETTING: A FOUNDATION FOR REVOLUTION 
 …generally blazing down without pity or moderation, but capable of 
unpredictable, fierce change. Immense, beautiful, sudden, savage and 
harsh; one gropes inadequately for the right adjectives to describe the 
country8   
 
   Understanding the starting point of the Algerian Revolution is requisite to  
comprehending the nature of the subsequent counterinsurgency.  The United States 
military has decided that during any counterinsurgency, the primary goal must be to 
win over the native population, which is something the French government failed to do 
in Algeria.  The root of the problem for many Muslims in Algeria was a lack of 
representation in local and national governments as Algerians were promised 
citizenship, which they never really received.  This problem was exacerbated by the 
hostile treatment at the hands of the European colonists who appropriated much of the 
best land and disproportionately dominated Algerian local politics, which resulted in 
biased laws meant to keep the Europeans in nearly complete control.  While many in the 
French government identified this as a problem, their efforts to enact reform failed 
repeatedly for a number of reasons that will be discussed in this chapter.  The French 
failure to overcome the practical difficulties in instituting reform characterized politics 
in French Algeria for its duration.  The failure to solve these problems resulted in an 
insurrection, known as the Algerian War.  
                                                 
8 Horne. p. 44 
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 The French counterinsurgency effort was made unusually difficult by the pieds 
noirs.  European pieds noirs, also referred to as colons by many Muslim Algerians, were 
adventurous people of various European descents and had conspicuously different 
interests than the mainland French.  The pieds noirs enjoyed a substantial advantage in 
terms of living conditions and government representation.  Dominating French Algerian 
politics, these settlers feared that an increase in representation for Muslims would 
threaten the way of life they had worked so hard to establish.  Therefore, pied noirs logic 
held that oppression of Muslim Algerians equated to protection of their own interests.  
Moreover, this oppressive attitude, a problem in itself over time, was coupled with 
racism and vitriol.  As a famous pied noirs poet, Jules Roy, admitted, “One thing I knew 
because it was told to me so often, was that the Arabs belonged to a different race, one 
inferior to my own.”9  In this environment, some members of the French government, 
who will be identified later, claimed prematurely, though their reform efforts never 
yielded anything substantial, that Muslim Algerians were really French citizens and that 
they were being assimilated.  This rhetoric was obviously not true because it never 
translated into tangible reform, which enhanced dissent among Algerian Muslims.  Even 
if the French government realized the dislocation between its rhetoric and reality, it 
failed to evaluate adequately the potential dissent it would create, or to overcome the 
significant roadblocks that certain elements of French domestic politics  provided.   
                                                 
9 Ibid. Pp. 54,55 
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 This would explain why assimilationist rhetoric, explained later, essentially fell 
on deaf ears and undermined the support for the French of Arab moderates.  Time and 
time again, pieds noirs interference was responsible for blocking political reforms 
intended to improve the political and social predicament of Muslim Algerians which 
might have precluded insurrection.  The extent of the difficulties faced by the French did 
not mean they were insurmountable.  After all, at the start of the insurgency in 1954, the 
FLN likely did not have the support of a majority of the Muslim population, or even for 
that matter of the Algerian Nationalists, who were fractured into several rival groups. 
The French claim, made throughout the insurrection, that the FLN insurgent group did 
not represent Muslim Algerians as a whole was justifiable for much of the Algerian War.  
However, French political failures, due to several complex factors, contributed to the 
FLN’s ability to win enough support of the Muslim population to supplant French 
authority.  David Galula, a counterinsurgency specialist who experienced more success 
than most as the commander of a French unit that was tasked with pacifying multiple 
regions in Algeria from 1956 to 1958, concluded that: 
There was no doubt in my mind that support from the population was 
the key to the whole problem for us as well as for the rebels. By 
“support” I mean not merely the sympathy or idle approval but active 
participation in the struggle.10  
 
If the population was the key, then the political failures of the past had to be confronted 
if their support was to ever materialize.  Thus, the mentalities of various French 
                                                 
10 David Galula. Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958. RAND Corporation (1963) p. 69 
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government officials, the French military, pieds noirs and Algerian Muslims at the 
outbreak of the conflict are crucial to understanding the entire conflict.   
 As stated earlier, over the course of the French presence in Algeria, the 
universalist French notion of sovereignty, which dated from the French Revolution, was 
repeatedly contradicted by the actual French involvement with Algerians on Algerian 
soil.  In 1955, the French Governor-General of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle, appointed by 
Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France, opined: 
 France is at home here… or rather, Algeria and all her inhabitants form 
an integral part of France, one and indivisible. All must know, here and 
elsewhere, that France will not leave Algeria any more than she will 
leave Provence and Brittany. Whatever happens the destiny of Algeria 
is French.11 
 
Even though it can be said that Soustelle’s words were likely genuine and there was 
serious consideration among reform-minded French politicians like Mendes France and 
Soustelle for minor liberal reform in Algeria, from the perspective of an Algerian, these 
sentiments were undercut by the memory of poor treatment at the hands of French 
colons.  After Algeria had been effectively “pacified,” following the 1830 invasion, the 
French took a large majority of the best land for themselves.  Even so, there were 
multiple efforts at reform to “assimilate” the Muslims of Algeria, as Todd Shepard has 
written the French government “expected all male inhabitants of Algeria to become 
French citizens eventually.” 12  However, even considering these good intentions, reality 
                                                 
11 Horne p. 108 
12 Todd Shepard. The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France. Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2006. pg. 22 
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took a very different course.  Progress towards actual equality for Muslim Algerians was 
repeatedly stalled.  The “native code,” promulgated in 1881, indicates that French 
promises reform were not really powerful enough to make Muslim Algerians equal to 
European pieds noirs.  According to Shepard, the code “instituted exorbitant penalties” 
for “infractions” that could only be committed by “natives,” which obviously referred to 
Muslims.  “This inscription,” Shepard explains, “signaled the close of an active French 
policy of legal assimilation.”13  “The National Assembly’s repeated re-authorization of 
the supposedly temporary native code offered constant reaffirmation of the presumed 
inferiority of ‘Muslims.’”14  Shepard argues that an “embrace of pragmatism over 
principle” by the French incubated the failure to reform from 1881 until well into the 20th 
century.15  By the 1950s, he adds, “The architects of integration admitted that official 
failure to grapple with the reality of the mass exclusion of 'Muslim' Algerians from 
citizenship had institutionalized discrimination.”16  In short, Algerian society and 
culture were replaced with that of the French for the duration of Algeria's colonization.  
 If a lack of meaningful political reform was at the heart of the mounting Muslim 
Algerian dissent to French rule, it cannot be said that such reform had not been 
attempted repeatedly.  However, due to the realities of French politics, characterized by 
a general lack of any sustained, cohesive political front that could actually push reform 
                                                 
13 Ibid. p. 31 
14 Ibid. p. 35 
15 Ibid. p. 23 
16 Ibid. pg. 47 
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through the intricate law-making process as well as bitter resistance from pieds noirs who 
were desperate to protect the way of life they had worked so hard to create, reform was 
constantly adulterated, delayed or defeated.  Alistair Horne discussed a process that 
repeated itself throughout his narrative of the French in Algeria:  “By and large, 
[attempts at reform] had followed a dismally stereotyped pattern, initiated by 
metropolitan France, frustrated by pieds noir pressure-groups.”17  Furthermore, France, 
following World War II was preoccupied with its own economic problems following the 
extreme destruction of French cities and industry during the war.  Charles de Gaulle 
once said that it would take “a whole generation of furious work” just to bring France 
back to what it had been in the 1930's.18   
 Thus, although there were a number of efforts by the French government to 
effect political change in Algeria after 1830, the failure to implement significant reforms 
represented the root of the problem for France’s effort to retain Algeria.  There were in 
fact a significant number of Muslim Algerians who wanted to be a part of France, and a 
majority probably who would have accepted some form of French presence.  After all, 
France did provide many observable benefits to Algeria, things like education, 
agriculture technology, improved public sanitation for cities and villages, and many 
other benefits.  However, the failure to implement meaningful political reform damaged 
the ability of French politicians to point to these benefits as reasons why Algeria should 
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remain French.  Failing to satisfy even the more modest political demands of Algerian 
moderates undermined the government's efforts to win Muslim support and 
precipitated the uprising.  
 Between the French invasion and the days leading up to the revolution, although 
occasional half-measures—the number of political reforms intended to increase 
representation for Muslim Algerians—had been attempted by French officials, the cold 
reality was that the pride of many Muslims had been assaulted by the colons for over a 
century.  In 1847, Alexis de Tocqueville, then a deputy in the French National Assembly, 
told his government that “We have rendered Muslim society much more miserable and 
much more barbaric than it was before it became acquainted with us.”19  One hundred 
and twenty years later, William Polk, a political scientist and advisor on American 
foreign policy in the Middle East sent to Algeria in the 1960s, similarly noted that he 
“found that Algerians were so totally excluded from the colon economy that even ‘mom 
and pop’ laundries and bakeries were European monopolies.”20  Therefore, failed reform 
efforts did not do enough to secure and sustain the loyalty of Muslim Algerians. The 
French plea that Algerians were actually French, meant to stem the tide of dissent, did 
not improve the economic and social realities on the ground and was constantly belied 
by daily experience. 
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 Furthermore, the promulgation of biased and racist laws, like the native code, 
created a rift between the French and the Algerians.  This rift was ripe for exploitation 
by nationalist Algerians.  Though much of the immediate culpability for the treatment of 
Muslim Algerians belongs to the pieds noirs, the French government was responsible for 
making good on its self-proclaimed duty to help Muslim Algerians attain political, social 
and economic equality.  Furthermore, the French Government remained dangerously 
inactive regarding the building tension.  Finally, the French effort to impose their culture 
upon Muslims in Algeria characterized the thoroughly unproductive effort to 
“assimilate” Algerians into France.  Assimilation appeared to many Muslims as mere 
talk, and real progress for Algerians came too little, too late.   
 As a preview of things to come, during the late spring of 1945, Muslim 
separatists viciously unleashed their pent-up fury on the relatively unsuspecting pieds 
noirs in and around the Algerian town of Setif.  The implications of the Setif massacre for 
the 1954 revolution are significant, as the brutal and atrocious acts committed by 
Algerian terrorists burned themselves into French collective memory.  Alistair Horne 
wrote of the uprising:  
The accumulated casualty reports made grisly reading: 103 Europeans 
murdered, plus another hundred wounded; a number of women brutally 
raped, including one aged eighty-four. Many of the corpses were appallingly 
mutilated: women with their breasts slashed off, men with their sexual 
organs stuffed into their mouths.21  
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For a society that historically thought of their Algerian neighbors as inferior, such brutal 
actions could only fuel that perception.  Reinforced by the Setif massacre, this perception 
would lead to the justification of later controversial methods utilized by the French 
against the insurgency, such as of collective punishment and torture.  The Setif massacre 
thus further dehumanized Muslim Algerians in the minds of pieds noirs and mainland 
French alike.  As will be evidenced in later chapters, American military scholars later 
concluded that such dehumanization influenced the nature of the counterinsurgency. 
 Between the Setif massacre in 1945 and the outbreak of revolution nine years 
later, the French government failed to appreciate the signs of mounting unrest among 
Muslim Algerians.  They continued to fail to enact any meaningful political reforms in 
Algeria that might have avoided, or at least have postponed, a violent revolution.  Pieds 
noirs opportunists used the emotions that the Setif massacre stirred up in France to 
justify their expansion of political control over Algeria.  Therefore, the outrage initiated 
by the massacre altered the political environment in a way that facilitated harsh reprisals 
by the army and the colons.  Further exacerbating the situation was a significant growth 
in the Muslim population (the Muslim population jumped from 5.6 million in 1931 to 8.5 
million in 1954)22 that coincided with economic troubles stemming from an influx of 
agricultural technology that made the labor of several thousands of Muslim agriculture 
workers obsolete.23  All of these problems—the resistance of pieds noirs to reform, 
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Muslim restlessness, and widespread unemployment--made Algeria a difficult nut for 
Paris to crack. 
 On 1 November, 1954, All Saints Day, groups of armed separatists attacked 
military and government targets all over Algeria.  At the same time, the FLN broadcast a  
communiqué explaining the ideological impetus for the violence.  The communique 
read, “Goal: National independence through… [the] …restoration of the Algerian state, 
sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework of the principles of Islam. “24 
The FLN and its allies wanted nothing less than full autonomy.  Almost two weeks later 
the Mendes-France administration responded that “one does not compromise when it 
comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and the integrity of the 
Republic.”25  This rebuttal was a clear indication that France was again defining Algeria 
as a part of the Republic, and perceived the issue to be a domestic matter.  The two 
opposing premises regarding the sovereignty of Algeria were mutually exclusive, so no 
common ground could be found. This essentially left the French with two options: 
withdraw and lose Algeria or destroy the FLN and secure permanent political stability.   
France's Prime Minister, Pierre Mendes-France, the same man who had negotiated 
France's withdrawal from Indochina, set the tone for the next five years: France was 
going to fight. 
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 The All Saints Day attack was aimed at the centers of French power in Algeria as 
army installations, police stations and pieds noir civilians were attacked throughout the 
country.  The selection of the targets was telling, as the insurgent forces had declared 
war on any “occupying” European foreigner.  Mendes-France quickly sent military 
reinforcements to find those responsible for the attacks and to prevent any future 
attacks.  Since the French had decided that the uprising was a domestic affair, many of 
the reinforcements were policemen.26  French forces immediately set to work hunting 
down the attackers.  There were mass arrests in which guilty and innocent alike were 
rounded up and sent to prisons or holding areas.  Pieds noirs were enraged by the attacks 
and pressured Paris for a tougher response.  Several known Algerian nationalist groups 
were outlawed, and the French grip on day-to day life in Algeria tightened.27 
 One tactic common among French forces in the early days of the Algerian War 
was the ratissage, literally meaning “raking over,” which was similar to a search and 
destroy mission.28  Early in the uprising, these missions were usually ill-defined and 
involved wide sweeps of areas based on incomplete intelligence.   These early examples, 
which often involved collective punishment and acts of violence, did more to hurt 
innocent Muslims who were “on the fence” than it did to injure the FLN.  It is 
noteworthy that Mendes-France and Jacques Soustelle both issued orders against such 
policies, but the convoluted political environment of the Algerian War, including 
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disobedience from the French military and significant political pressure from pied noirs 
interest groups, meant that collective punishment continued.29  Much like torture, these 
often clumsy, nebulously targeted ratissages, especially those involving the harsh 
treatment of innocents, actually served to radicalize Algerians who might otherwise 
have remained neutral.30 
 As the French military and police worked to stem the attacks on European 
settlers, the FLN expanded its attacks against Muslims.  Muslims were much more 
vulnerable to the FLN's attacks than pieds noirs, since France put a higher emphasis on 
protecting Europeans.  The FLN attacks on Muslim civilians were intended to drive a 
wedge between the Muslim population and the French government.  If Muslims could 
be coerced into disassociating from the French “assimilation” would be impossible, thus 
making the permanent occupation of Algerian soil untenable.  The French political 
leadership recognized the threat this posed and became convinced that political and 
social reform were critically necessary.  However, the pieds noirs, who believed that their 
entire way of life rested on their ability to rule over the Muslims of Algeria, bitterly 
resisted political and social reforms.   As one scholar has put it, “The failure of this 
policy [that is to institute meaningful reform] in all its guises, or its abandonment, meant 
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the end of French Algeria.”31  France was forced to either make difficult, politically 
unpopular decisions or wage a losing war as best it could. 
 Early in the war, the FLN lacked a developed organization and adequate 
funding.  The organization was therefore forced to be frugal when planning its 
operations.32  But although it was poorly supplied, the FLN was able to establish a 
grassroots movement across many parts of Algeria, indeed, decentralized, local violence 
spread even as the FLN's leaders were being apprehended.  In spite of key gains made 
by the French in apprehending FLN leaders, the insurgent organization survived and 
was able to establish the beginnings of a “state within a state” in Algeria.  This “state 
within a state” concept is essential for the success of any insurgency, as it serves to 
legitimize the insurgency as an heir-apparent government and helps to convince the 
populace of its permanence.   
 In 1954 it was very difficult to determine which side held the advantage.  On the 
one hand, nearly all of the revolutionary leadership had been captured or arrested by 
French forces and several regional networks were completely bankrupt or dispersed.33  
However, the methods by which the French forces accomplished these successes 
coupled with the political environment of French Algeria did more in the long run to 
fuel a popular uprising than prevent it.  Though shaky and rudimentary by nature, the 
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FLN did succeed in establishing a “state within a state” and, perhaps more importantly, 
simply survived.   
 In 1955 the FLN staged a bloody massacre in Phillipville, an action that may have 
been the turning point in the entire war.  The FLN decided to use terrorism, in the form 
of gruesome attacks on civilians, in an attempt to provoke a heavy-handed response 
from the French forces.  As the FLN leadership had already concluded, the French 
doctrine of “collective responsibility” served as, according to one FLN official, “our best 
recruiting agent.”34  In essence, the FLN trap worked, as the French responded with  
brutality.  While militarily French forces benefited in the short term from severe military 
retaliation, in the long term the insurgency benefited more. 
 During the months leading up to the Battle of Algiers, which occurred in the 
densely populated Algerian capital, the FLN followed a strategy of terrorism against 
“soft targets” (usually non-military, lightly guarded civilian targets, which were much 
easier to attack and more likely to induce reprisals) in order to keep pressure on the 
French forces and expand their own support.  The insurgent strategy had worked in 
rural areas, and the FLN decided that the time had come to expand the insurgency to an 
urban setting like Algiers.  The battle that ensued, timed to maximize international 
attention on the conflict as the United Nations was scheduled to debate the “Algerian 
Question,” was meant to prove that the insurgency was urban as well as rural.  The 
French, maintaining their military-focused tactics over time effectively destroyed the 
                                                 
34 Horne. p. 110 
28 
 
operational capabilities of the FLN in and around Algiers.  Following the military 
victory in Algiers, French forces continued their aggressive pursuit of the remaining 
FLN apparatus.  Using their refined counterinsurgency techniques, they succeeded in 
improving security in Algeria as the FLN was eventually pushed into bordering Tunisia 
and Morocco. The French also set up an effective series of fortifications, known as the 
Morice Line, in order to close the borders to prevent re-infiltration by those FLN 
members that had been forced out of the country.35 
 As the sources will demonstrate, valuable lessons have been learned from the 
effective military operations conducted and perfected by the French during the Battle of 
Algiers and their subsequent rout of remaining FLN forces.  However, these military 
lessons have been qualified, as successful counterinsurgencies are not typically 
accomplished by military force alone.  The more successful the French were in 
destroying the FLN, the clearer it was to French politicians that without a political 
solution, military success would be wasted.  However, the growing perception of French 
politicians, who reasoned that military victory could serve only as leverage for a more 
advantageous agreement with insurgent forces, was not shared by the military 
leadership or the pieds noirs.   
 When De Gaulle moved towards a settlement with the FLN that would recognize 
a dramatically reduced role in Algeria for France, French military and pied noirs leaders 
felt betrayed, and a domestic crisis exploded in France.  As a result, all the different 
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political entities mentioned earlier, motivated by their own various interests, were 
unprepared for the disorganized conclusion of the Algerian War.  The lack of continuity 
among these political entities was central to the French national failure.  As this thesis 
will demonstrate, the lack of a coherent, clear and internationally acceptable strategy by 
the French doomed their efforts in Algeria from the start.  Political progress failed to 
materialize and military success, according to the U.S. military interpretation, was thus 
wasted.  The narrative of French involvement in Algeria involves both effective and 
ineffective policies, both of which are valuable for later generations of military and 
political thinkers. The remaining chapters of this thesis trace the lessons learned by 
subsequent military and political leaders and analysts from both French successes and 














AMERICAN COUNTERINSURGENCY HISTORY 
...Algerian insurgents did not achieve much military success of any kind; 
instead  they garnered decisive popular support through superior 
organizational skills and propaganda that exploited French mistakes. These and 
other factors, including the loss of will in France, compelled the French to 
surrender-U.S. Army/ Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2006) 
 
 Learning lessons from history is not something the United States military lacks 
the ability to do.  In nearly every conflict in which the U.S. has participated, its military 
has proved adept at learning from its mistakes and adjusting its tactics, which Mark 
Moyar attributes to competent leadership.  As Mark Moyar has observed,  
“Conventional forces adapted very well when they had adaptive commanders, even 
when they had not been exposed to counterinsurgency doctrine.”36  However, although 
the U.S. military has adapted well during each individual war to the particular 
circumstances it encountered, it has consciously resisted the permanent 
institutionalization of counterinsurgency doctrine, so lessons have had to be repeatedly 
relearned at great cost.  In particular, counterinsurgency represents a concept that, as 
one expert puts it, “the U.S. military has typically paid little attention to.”37  The history 
of American counterinsurgency must be understood in this light.  Whatever lessons 
about counterinsurgency were learned, and whatever doctrinal progress was made, was 
usually subordinated to the view that the military should focus on the “destruction of 
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military targets,” therefore relegating stability operations and pacification to civilian, 
non-military entities.38 
  The resistance of the U.S. military to the permanent implementation of 
counterinsurgency lessons has a long history.  This repeated, historical pattern in 
American military history has been called “counterinsurgency syndrome.”39  Indeed, 
when tracing the history of American counterinsurgency doctrine, one does not 
encounter a sustained progression of building on real-life experiences.  Rather, one finds 
a history of learning and then forgetting. 
 The forward to the current U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual states, 
This manual is designed to fill a doctrinal gap... With our Soldiers 
and Marines fighting insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is 
essential that we give them a manual that provides principles and 
guidelines for counterinsurgency operations. Such guidance must be 
grounded in historical studies.40 
 
An example of such a “doctrinal gap” can be found during one of the United States’ first 
major counterinsurgencies: the American Civil War.  During the mid-19th century, the 
concept of irregular war was undercut by the assumption that only conventional war 
was “honorable.”  Nonetheless, units were given extremely vague orders and urged to 
use whatever means deemed appropriate.  The Union initially treated the existence of 
Confederate insurgents as primarily a political issue, intending to win them over.  
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However, that changed over the course of the war as it became apparent that the 
political demands of the two sides were mutually exclusive, forcing the Union to adopt a 
more aggressive strategy.41  But even though this led to operations designed specifically 
to root-out irregular guerrillas, the army had no interest in developing a permanent 
mechanism to institutionalize counterinsurgency.  
 The United States' next rendezvous with an insurgency followed its brief war 
with Spain in 1898-1899.  American forces captured the Philippines in order to use them 
as a bargaining chip in the negations to end the war.  For reasons that remain in debate, 
the United States decided to occupy the archipelago after a successful conventional 
campaign.42  Upon meeting armed resistance from the local population, American forces 
responded extemporaneously, for there was no coherent, overall strategy in place at the 
outbreak of the insurgency.  As in the counterinsurgency operations of the American 
Civil War, U.S. forces initially treated the uprising as a political matter and attempted to 
solve it by political means.  President William McKinley said that “it should be the 
earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, 
and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines.”43  This attitude prevailed until, 
frustrated by a lack of observable progress against the insurgents and stoked by criticism 
in the press, U.S. policy shifted to focus on the destruction of the opposing force.  “Swift 
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methods of destruction,” as suggested by one general,  replaced benevolence.44  The 
United States ultimately emerged victorious in its political goal in the Philippines of 
retaining political control.   
 The lessons from the Philippine Insurrection, even if largely discarded, may have 
done more to hurt American efforts against future insurgencies than help.  American 
forces triumphed after they changed their methods from political benevolence to violent 
suppression and intimidation.  This invariably led those few military men who gave any 
thought to future counterinsurgencies to conclude that pacification was more likely to 
succeed with opposing force-destruction and intimidation than it would by appealing to 
the population by other means.  One general remarked, “A short and severe war creates 
in the aggregate less loss and suffering than a benevolent war indefinitely prolonged.”45  
The lure of such logic for the military establishment was strong, especially since it 
seemed to be confirmed by experience.  However, as democratic nations found their 
societies less tolerant of such violence and communications technology became more 
advanced—bringing with it the advancement of many forms of liberal ideals—dirty 
wars of considerable brutality and mass human suffering, even if only short-lived, 
resulted in by-products—like international pressure and the alienation of the target 
populace—that became more and more severe.  Therefore, according to its current 
doctrine, the U.S. military has decided that the only way it could fight 
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counterinsurgencies in this “new counterinsurgency era” was to focus on winning over 
the population instead of relying on military force, like they did in to win the Philippine 
Insurrection. 
 Over the next few decades, during both world wars, American forces did not 
participate in significant counterinsurgency operations, but their experience both in 
Europe and the Pacific helped to cement conventional warfare as the primary strategic 
focus.  After the world wars the United States did not encounter major insurgencies in 
dealing with former enemies, as most of the defeated powers already had experience 
with market capitalism, and were not resistant to liberal democracy.   
 The United States military defines stability operations as, 
...various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside of the 
United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to 
maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential 
government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and 
humanitarian relief.46  
 
Even the experience with stability operations in Japan and in Western Europe, which 
contain some of the essential elements of counterinsurgency, did not survive long in 
military practice.  “Despite its successful state-building enterprises in Germany and 
Japan following World War II,” David Ucko writes, “[the U.S. military] did not 
institutionalize or prepare for any similar contingencies.”47  This helps explain the 
“doctrinal gap,” experienced yet again when American forces committed themselves to 
supporting the fledgling government in South Vietnam. 
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 As a large portion of the United States military deployed for war in Vietnam in 
1965 it thought of counterinsurgency as, at best, a secondary issue.  Instead the United 
States was thoroughly committed to fighting conventional wars.  However, North 
Vietnamese forces were experts at participating only in battles they determined to be 
favorable.  John Nagl, a lieutenant colonel and expert on counterinsurgency warfare 
wrote, “The United States Army entered the Vietnam War with a doctrine well suited for 
conventional war in Europe, but worse than worthless for the counterinsurgency it was 
about to [undertake.]”48   
 The central objective of the United States was to stop the spread of communism 
in South Vietnam, primarily by building up and protecting the Republic of Vietnam 
(South Vietnam).  The strategy of destroying communist military forces through attrition 
overlooked the salient concern for the U.S.: the political stability and viability of its ally, 
the Republic of Vietnam.  South Vietnamese forces made themselves very unpopular 
throughout the countryside, and the failure of American forces seriously to confront this 
issue resulted eventually in its failure to meet its original objective: the establishment of 
a strong, popular non-communist South Vietnam.49  Nagl summed up the Vietnam War 
as a conflict that 
demonstrates the triumph of the institutional culture of an organization 
over attempts at doctrinal innovation and the diminution of the 
effectiveness of the organization at accomplishing national interests. The 
United States Army had become reliant on firepower and technological 
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superiority in its history of annihilating enemy forces; although political 
considerations may have governed the strategic conduct of the war, they 
had little connection with the tactical-level management of violence.50 
 
Ingrained habits that had become institutionalized, he added, posed an insurmountable 
obstacle to military innovation, which came from the bottom-up based on smaller units’ 
combat experience.   
 Vietnam, Nagl argues, clearly demonstrated the need for an institutionalized 
counterinsurgency doctrine, rather than the old habit of relearning and re-adapting, 
which has proven so costly.  After all, it would seem only logical that a war involving 
multiple counterinsurgency operations and resulting in tens of thousands of Americans 
killed in action and costing billions of dollars would actually have a lasting institutional 
impact regarding the military's approach to such operations.  General Westmoreland, 
who was in charge of the war from 1964 to 1968, concluded, “This new and traumatic 
experience by our nation should provide lessons for our people, our leadership, the 
news media, and our soldiers.”51  But while “lessons” were learned, these lessons 
ironically reflected a belief that counterinsurgency should be avoided.  Even though it 
would seem logical that the U.S. military would have focused more on 
counterinsurgency following Vietnam, it interpreted the war as proof that such 
operations only distracted the military from its true purpose (conventional force 
destruction) and thus were to be avoided.   
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 The next significant war in which the American military found itself, the First 
Gulf War, did not in fact involve counterinsurgency at all.  After the United States easily 
defeated Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army in a short series of conventional battles, 
American President George H.W. Bush decided, with the ghosts of Vietnam 
undoubtedly in the back of his mind, not to expand military operations far into Iraq and 
not to attempt a regime change there. The war also displayed the U.S. military's 
preference for conventional war, as Saddam Hussein's regime was spared despite its 
hostility to U.S. interests.  
 However, once President Bush decided to assist the humanitarian efforts in 
Somalia in 1993 by sending troops, American troops faced a different situation and 
counterinsurgency warfare reared its ugly head again. The lessons of Somalia were 
different.  Mark Bowden characterized the way the U.S. military explained the situation 
in Mogadishu to its soldiers, as recounted in his bestselling account of the Battle of 
Mogadishu, Black Hawk Down,  
Warlords had so ravaged the nation battling among themselves that 
their people were starving to death. When the world sent food, the evil 
warlords hoarded it and killed those who tried to stop them. So the 
civilized world had decided to [respond by deploying special forces]... 
to clean things up.”52  
 
Such a task could not be accomplished by conventional warfare.  Using tactics that 
reflected a poor understanding of urban combat among a dense population the 
American force there had two helicopters shot down, and in the attempt to rescue the 
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fallen crew, 19 soldiers were killed in action.53  The reaction of the American public to 
the events in Mogadishu—which involved a demand for troops to be withdrawn 
without the achievement of the central objective—indicated a lack of support for such 
missions.  Even though a much larger war, The Gulf War, involved more troops and 
more casualties remained popular in the United States, the much smaller engagement in 
Somalia, with a fraction of the casualties resulted in more domestic unrest.  While there 
were tactical lessons regarding the execution of urban combat, derived from the battle, 
counterinsurgency itself remained on the back burner.  
 In the context of the history of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq represents the 21st Century Vietnam.  Because the war is still ongoing, its 
complete history cannot yet be written.  However, it has already secured a place in the 
history of counterinsurgency.  George W. Bush had decided before the war that, unlike 
his father during the previous Gulf War, he must end Saddam Hussein's regime after the 
conventional invasion of Iraq.  This meant that a new state, one fashioned along the lines 
of liberal, representative governments existing in the West, was to be “built” and 
protected.  Therefore, political stability became the end and occupation was merely the 
means.  However, the occupation proved difficult, as an insurgency began to 
materialize.  This was a problem of particular significance for American forces as, in 
David Ucko's words, “the U.S. military's attitude toward stability operations [right 
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before the war] can be understood as a combination of disinterest and aversion.”54  
Therefore, as in many other situations in their history, American forces found 
themselves unprepared for what they encountered.  This has been highlighted in a 
military research study done by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy of the 
“seven essential intelligence mistakes” made by American planners.  One of these 
“mistakes,” according to the report, was that “the planning focused strongly on the 
traditional military tasks, to the exclusion of post-combat requirements. In particular, the 
military intelligence estimates did not correctly predict the rapid development of a 
significant anti-coalition group.”55  Thus, counterinsurgency abruptly returned to 
significance.  
 The current counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is similar.  Although less 
precipitous than in Iraq, the insurgency in Afghanistan has gained momentum after the 
conventional war had apparently ended, and continues to threaten the American 
objective of establishing a democratic, pro-coalition government.  In both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the U.S. military has had to relearn the lessons it should have already 
learned from previous history.  Will the United States military finally institutionalize the 
“lessons” from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?  As one expert put it, “It is imperative 
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that the U.S. military engage with rather than seek to forget the many lessons from 
Iraq.”56    
 The interpretation following the Vietnam War that counterinsurgency should be 
avoided instead of perfected, was not overturned until after Operation Iraqi Freedom in 
2003.  As Moyar has written, “Vietnam had taught [the U.S. military] to steer clear of 
counterinsurgencies.”57  However, the unexpected momentum and severity of the Iraq 
insurgency forced the Pentagon to scramble for ways to “adapt” as it has had to do often 
throughout history.  Currently, there are many experts who suggest these lessons should 
be permanently institutionalized by the U.S. military.  This is due to the popularly-held 
view, one that has been gaining momentum since the initial difficulties surrounding the 
occupation of Iraq beginning in 2003, that counterinsurgency operations will be 
necessary for years to come.  According to the current doctrine of American 
counterinsurgency, re-learning lessons during a time of war, as evidenced by the 
ongoing counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, has been an extremely costly 
endeavor, one that the United States in the future would by wise to avoid.  It is for 
exactly this reason, that the United States military has developed a strong interest in the 
Algerian War.  However, one expert noted, “The fundamental problem with the U.S. 
military's aversion to counterinsurgency and stability operations is that it has confused 
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the undesirability of these missions with an actual ability to avoid them.”58   Even though 
the U.S. military wanted to avoid counterinsurgency, partially based on its experience in 
Vietnam, world events and strategic interests since have made it unavoidable.  
 In a recent analysis of the history of leadership in counterinsurgency operations, 
Mark Moyar has listed “ten attributes of effective counterinsurgency leaders.”  Three of 
these attributes, “Empathy,” “Charisma,” and “Sociability,” involve social and cultural 
relationships between the counterinsurgency force and the host nation's populace.59    
“Empathy,” he writes, “enables leaders to appreciate the thoughts and feeling of 
others...This asset is of obvious value in influencing the civilian populace in an insurgent 
conflict.”  Charisma, he adds, is useful for commanders to make “people more willing to 
follow their lead... not only on subordinates but also on every other friendly or neutral 
person, [and] charismatic leaders,” he says, ”wield influence in all cultures.”  Sociability 
comes into play as “counterinsurgency commanders must talk with leaders of other 
organizations and other nationalities to obtain their cooperation.”60  All three are critical 
for the leaders of counterinsurgency forces in accurately determining and assessing the 
perceptions of the host nation's population.   
 These attributes are indirectly important to the Algerian War in a strategy 
research project written in 2008 by Kenneth Detreux, an officer at the U.S. Army War 
College. Detreux argues forcefully that: 
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Counterinsurgency forces must understand that criticality of the center 
of gravity in a counterinsurgency environment: the populace.... The 
French had a far greater history in Algeria and quelled previous 
insurgencies over the time of their colonial rule. Throughout, the French 
failed to fully understand the importance of focusing their efforts on the 
dominant Muslim community and lift some of the repressive laws and 
rules governing Algeria.61 
 
Detreux implies the importance of relationships between soldiers and civilians, and 
Moyar's three attributes are critical in this regard.  Such arguments, when applied to the 
particular circumstances of the Algerian War, make it clear how important 
understanding and dealing with the Algerian populace was to the overall success of the 
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THE ALGERIAN WAR: A POLITICAL AFFAIR 
Experience shows that in this sort of war the political factors are just as 
important as the military ones, if not more so. This was particularly true in 
Algeria, where especially after 1956, there was practically no military contest 
in the conventional sense owing to the superiority of the French armed 
forces...62 - David Galula in Pacification in Algeria (1964) 
 
 Counterinsurgency, at its heart, is a political endeavor.  While military force is a 
necessary and significant part, such force is but a means to an end, it is not the end itself.  
Specifically, counterinsurgency, as interpreted by the U.S. military, is political because in 
order to achieve victory the “host” population must be convinced that whatever political 
outcome the counterinsurgent entity is attempting to bring about and sustain is 
desirable.  The active participation of the host-nation populace is necessary in this 
endeavor.  Algeria, particularly, reinforces this logic as most of its people eventually 
accepted the FLN even though it had been militarily defeated. 
 The salient causal connection between the Algerian War and the development of 
current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is represented by the U.S. Army/U.S. Marine 
Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.  Already referenced several times, this military 
publication is the corporate result of years of research, experience, interpretation and 
synthesis by several authors within the United States military.  The work is not an 
academic research project, therefore its assertions are not directly cited, making it 
difficult to locate exactly which historical precedent led to exactly which doctrinal 
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development.  Furthermore, determining how much of an influence the Algerian War 
had on the various authors, who are anonymous, is impossible to tell.  However, this 
should not deter analysis of the causal foundation of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine as 
valuable research is possible despite this inherent difficulty.   
 By piecing together various reports written by America's military leaders, and 
the prevalence of French counterinsurgency experiences in American military 
publications and journals—which are authored by the very same “COIN 
[Counterinsurgency] community,” as a leading expert on the topic refers to it, that 
engineer official doctrine—the argument that the Algerian War has an exceptional role 
in the development of current American counterinsurgency doctrine can be defended.63  
Serving as perhaps the “smoking gun” regarding a direct causal connection between the 
Algerian War and the development of current U.S. counterinsurgency strategy is the 
aforementioned counterinsurgency field manual, also known as FM 3-24.  This 
publication includes in its index multiple entries for Algeria, and dedicates an entire 
section to the “laws” of David Galula.  Furthermore, it lists the work of multiple 
“classics,” including works by French military officers who served in the Algerian War, 
including Galula, and Alistair Horne's, A Savage War of Peace.  The forward to the 
bibliography reads: 
This bibliography is a tool for the Army and Marine Corps leaders to 
help them increase their knowledge of insurgency and counter-
insurgency.  Reading what others have written provides a foundation 
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that leaders can use to access counterinsurgency situations and make 
appropriate decisions. The books and articles that follow... are... some of 
the more useful for Soldiers and Marines.64 
 
Therefore, the French experience in Algeria and the development of counterinsurgency 
doctrine, according to the U.S. Army/ U.S. Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual, are 
directly connected.  
 Gillo Pontecorvo's masterpiece, The Battle of Algiers, produced less than three  
years after the Algerian War, represents more than a classic film,  for it also occupies a 
surprisingly significant place within the history of the development of 
counterinsurgency theory and strategy.  Whether or not the film itself is a useful tool to 
strategists and policy-makers is debatable, it is apparent that several journalists, army 
leaders and government officials have taken great interest in it with that in mind.  As a 
September, 2003 New York Times article reported,  
The Pentagon recently held a screening of 'The Battle of Algiers,'... The 
Pentagon's showing drew a[n]... audience of 40 officers and civilian 
experts who were urged to consider and discuss the implicit issues at the 
core of the film- the problematic but alluring efficacy of brutal and 
repressive means in fighting clandestine terrorists in places like Algeria 
and Iraq more specifically, the advantages and costs of resorting to torture 
and intimidation seeking vital human intelligence about enemy plans.65  
 
Although there exists a dearth of Army sources that elaborate on the decision to show 
the film, this excerpt clearly demonstrates the value the Directorate for Special 
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict assigned to the film, and also indicates their 
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perception of the importance of the  Algerian War itself.  Due to the film's attention to 
detail and the director's apparent commitment to accuracy, The Battle of Algiers, while 
not a documentary, serves as a useful chronicle of the battle and, more importantly, an 
examination of the causal nexus inherent in reprisal-based counterinsurgency.  Because 
of the success the film has enjoyed with mass audiences, it is particularly effective in 
bringing before the public the otherwise complex and confusing topic of 
counterinsurgency.  
 Deriving historical significance or applicable lessons from fictional accounts, 
especially those from the silver screen can of course be problematic, as the demands of 
having to entertain an audience coupled with the personal bias inherent in the film-
making process can result in a film that is more important for its message than its 
historical accuracy.  Generally, it is therefore advisable to view films of this kind with 
some skepticism, and often even as propagandist and sensationalist presentations. This 
is especially true of works of any kind relating to the Algerian War.66  
 Yet this does not exterminate the historical value of The Battle of Algiers.  The film 
is unique among dramatizations of the Algerian War as it largely overcomes many of the 
aforementioned drawbacks.  Even considering the close proximity between the events 
themselves and the production of the film, which might seem to preclude sufficient 
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reflection and result in sensationalist or propagandist tones, Gillo Pontecorvo's film 
would seem to be the exception and not the rule.67  As one historian says, 
Not only does it depict both sides of the war with objectivity and 
detachment, and both its Algerian and French victims with equal 
sympathy, it also refuses to moralize about the methods used by the 
French in suppressing the terrorism of the FLN.68 
 
Similarly, a Washington Post editorial said about the film, 
The French, nominally the 'villains' in this story, would have no 
monopoly on evil... The revolutionaries, nominally the 'good guys,' would 
have no monopoly on virtue: They would be murderers, thugs, cutthroats, 
given entirely to a war of terror and bringing death to the innocent...69 
 
Because of its efforts at balance and its relative lack of pronounced bias or political 
agenda, the film has generally been treated as a quasi-historical study of the war.  The 
film's structure and narrative are quite persuasive in this regard.  For Pontecorvo shows, 
in an apparently logical and dispassionate manner, the unfolding of events, the 
escalatory nature of urban terrorism and the counterinsurgency it prompts. This point is 
made by one of Pontecorvo's colleagues, PierNico Solinas, a fellow intellectual, 
filmmaker and writer, who offers his own characterization of the universal, practical use 
of the film, which turns out to be consistent with the attitude certain Pentagon officials 
have shown towards Pontecorvo's film.  Solinas's prose serves as a useful summary of 
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the logic that justifies the film's relevance to the determination of public and military 
policy. 
In exploring its most significant implications, [Pontecorvo] seeks to draw from 
history a critical conclusion that can exist independently of the Algerian struggle. 
That very struggle becomes a proving ground which elevates to the level of an 
archetypal situation from which a theory can be deduced. By illustrating the 
teachings and methods of revolutionary struggle, The Battle of Algiers offers a 
blueprint for other struggles and other revolutions.... Thus the movie resists being 
dated or limited to a specific historical setting.... The action takes place in Algiers 
but it very well could happen anywhere else.70 
 
For 21st century audiences, the use of the phrase “anywhere else” evokes American -
occupied Iraq, as the Pentagon likely concluded.  Specifically, in the film, FLN attacks 
were shown to cause the French to implement tighter security measures.  These were 
countered with new FLN attacks to which the French respond by pressing harder and 
harder.  The way in which the movie portrays the cycle of escalation, leading to more 
death and destruction, is extremely accurate as a depiction of events, but it also serves as 
a useful summarization of historical precedent that can be related to later, similar 
situations. It is hardly surprising, then, that one reviewer notes that the film was used by 
the Pentagon as a “source document,” for the events it portrays represent a realistic 
representation of the reality of counterinsurgency.71    
 This point has been made by others as well.  A 2003 article written for the New 
Yorker, by Phillip Gourevitch, suggests a very clear connection between the contents of 
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Pontecorvo's film and the events in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Gourevitch 
writes: 
 
For all the differences between France's fight to keep Algeria... and 
America's current dispensation in Iraq, the parallels between the drama 
of insurgency and counter-insurgency in The Battle of Algiers and our 
present Iraqi predicament are as clear as day and as depressing as the 
Pentagon film programmers promised.72 
 
Using the lens of the film, Gourevitch immediately senses the parallels between the 
events of the Algerian War and those of Iraq.  He goes on to juxtapose the rhetorical 
question asked by Mathieu, the composite character commanding the French paratroops 
in the film,  “Is France to remain in Algeria? If your answer is still yes, you must accept 
all the necessary consequences” with George W. Bush's assertion that America intended 
to “stay the course” in Iraq.73  The connections made in this article are direct and specific, 
indicating that Pontecorvo's film has a place not only in film history but in the history of 
counterinsurgency as well.   
 Indeed, in an age of heightened awareness of terrorism and the methods of 
counterinsurgency, journalists, government officials, and military officers have revisited 
the Algerian War via The Battle of Algiers. Carlo Celli, in his 2004-2005 review in Film 
Quarterly entitled “Gillo Pontecorvo's Return to Algiers by Gillo Pontecorvo” confirms 
this. “Since the attacks of 9/11,” he notes, “there has been increased interest in the film... 
                                                 




The Battle of Algiers received a limited re-release in major cities in late 2003.”74  “Late 
2003” obviously coincides with the early American occupation of Iraq, which almost 
certainly prompted this renewed interest in Gillo Pontecorvo's film.  Another journalist, 
writing for the New York Times, in an article titled “Film; Lessons of the Pentagon's 
Favorite Training Film” assumes the film's importance with regards to policy, though he 
also warns that “its lessons ought to be applied to other situations cautiously, precisely 
because of the film's principal strength: its deep roots in a specific time and place.”75   
Various other articles--the film became available on DVD once again in 2004--confirm 
the renewed interest in the film because of its relevance to American foreign policy and 
military strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Simply put, as former national-security 
adviser Zbigniew Brezezinski put it, “If you want to understand what's happening in 
Iraq, I recommend The Battle of Algiers.”76  
 The film accurately depicts the decentralized structure of the FLN, a structure 
typical of most historical insurgent groups.  Similarly, there are scenes of military 
officers marking on chalk boards, filling out recent information obtained through 
interrogation which are largely accepted as accurate by the U.S. military.  Detreux, in his 
military research report, points to these scenes in discussing the importance of “French 
forces,” he notes, “were able to systematically break down the organization. This cellular 
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structure of the FLN/ALN was depicted in Gino Pontecarvo's [sic] movie, The Battle of 
Algiers, where the paratrooper commander, working on a blackboard, was 
systematically filling in the wire diagram of those insurgents identified, captured or 
killed.”77  This particular quote is significant because it represents a direct link between 
military analysis of historical precedent in counterinsurgency and the Gillo Pontecorvo's 
The Battle of Algiers.  The fact that Detreaux, himself a military officer, referenced the film 
as an example of a representation of counterinsurgent intelligence analysis proves The 
Battle of Algiers' significance to the U.S. military.    
 However, as valuable as watching Pontecorvo's film was likely to have been to 
Pentagon officials and military officers, as indicated by the counterinsurgency field 
manual, The Battle of Algiers includes only a snapshot of the Algerian War, as the events 
it depicts are limited to the actual urban battle.  Study of the larger Algerian War from 
historical documents, monographs and government reports have had a much larger 
impact on counterinsurgency thinking than Pontecorvo's film. 
 A leading voice on counterinsurgency, John Nagl, has written:  
The ultimate determinant of the success or failure of counterinsurgency 
theory and practice is the attainment of national objectives; neglecting the 
explicit consideration of this characteristic would only relegate it to the 
realm of unstated but inescapable facts. It is better to confront it 
directly.78  
 
Nagl's “national objectives” are political ones, and he argues that to ignore this 
“characteristic” of counterinsurgency operations would be detrimental.  While there 
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have been other successful methods of counterinsurgency in the past, like the American 
focus on military solutions and coercion during the Philippine Insurrection, the current 
U.S. military has decided that such methods cannot work in today's liberal, inter-
connected global society.  The eminent British counterinsurgency expert, Sir Robert 
Thompson, also lists as his first and foremost “principle of counterinsurgency” that “the 
government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, 
independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and 
viable.”79    The Algerian War, more than other wars, strongly suggests this.  The FLN 
had been completely militarily defeated by the French, yet it was the political 
environment surrounding the war that precluded a French victory.  This chapter deals 
with the particular lessons derived by military thinkers from the Algerian War, which 
are more political than military in nature. 
 Lt. Colonel David Galula, the French military officer and one of the most 
internationally influential counterinsurgency thinkers, has been the subject of many 
United States Army and Marine Corps studies.  Several American War College and 
Strategic Studies Institute theses and research papers have been dedicated to the study 
and evaluation of Galula's theories and his experience in the Algerian War.  The Military 
Review's massive, two-hundred page “special edition” titled, “Counterinsurgency 
Reader,” for example, begins and ends with quotes from him.80  Also, the U.S. 
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Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual quotes him several times.  Galula's 
experience with counterinsurgency came largely from his direct involvement in the 
Algerian War.  He contributed to the establishment of the view that counterinsurgency 
was “a political war” with his Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, published 
in 1964.81    Serving in Algeria from 1956 to 1958, Galula observed first-hand the nature of 
counterinsurgency warfare. Galula’s experience and the importance of his testimony 
have been widely noted; in the introduction to a 2006 article in the RAND Review, the 
anonymous author observed that  
The recollections of RAND consultant Lt. Col. David Galula... have a 
remarkable, almost timeless resonance nearly half a century later, 
with striking parallels to America's recent experiences in Iraq.... He 
died in 1967...depriving America of his guidance at a time when the 
United States was becoming more deeply involved in Vietnam.82 
 
Similarly, a United States Army Colonel went so far as to say,  
While [Galula's] strategy should be purely applied in hot 
revolutionary insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, I contend that his 
strategy is also broad enough to apply against non-state actors, or an 
insurgency without state borders, such as al-Qaeda and its ilk.83 
 
Such quotations make it clear that Galula's contributions, chiefly derived from the 
Algerian War, had a great influence on the development of American counterinsurgency 
strategy. 
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 If Galula's writings indicate the Algerian War's impact on American 
counterinsurgency strategy, it is his “essential laws of counterinsurgency” that are his 
greatest contributions.  The first law, “the objective is the population,” which has 
already been discussed, has become the cornerstone of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy.  
The Tactics in Counterinsurgency field manual (2009), which is less focused on the 
strategic aspects of counterinsurgency and more focused on the tactical methods 
American soldiers should use, states, “At its heart, a counterinsurgency is an armed 
struggle for the support of the population. This support can be achieved through 
information engagement, strong representative government, access to goods and 
services, fear, or violence,”84 and in support of this strategy cites David Galula's laws of 
counterinsurgency.85  While it may now seem obvious that the population is the key to 
counterinsurgency, this was not the attitude of past military generations.  This is exactly 
why Galula, writing in 1964, referred to counterinsurgency as a “new mission” and 
asserted that military minds had to be “adapted... to the special demands of 
counterinsurgency warfare.”86  But even up until the 2003 Iraq War, American military 
leadership still regarded the destruction of opposing forces as paramount. Nagl writes,  
[The U.S. Army during the Vietnam War] saw its raison d'etre as winning 
wars through the application of firepower and maneuver to annihilate 
enemy forces simply could not conceive of another kind of war in which 
its weapons, technology, and organization not only could not destroy the 
enemy, but usually could not even find or identify him.87  
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Thus, when the United States finally took counterinsurgency doctrine seriously, it was 
seen as a new concept.  Likewise, to focus on winning over the population was not an 
established concept even by the late twentieth century.   
 Galula's second law of counterinsurgency states that “support [of the 
counterinsurgent force by the target populace] is gained through an active minority.”  
Essentially, Galula relies here on the tested assumption that “in any situation, whatever 
the case, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active 
minority against the cause.”88  Such was the case in Algeria, as the FLN represented a 
minority that wanted to gain majority support.  Commenting on this situation, a major 
in the United States Army who wrote his master of military art and science thesis on 
David Galula's doctrine and its implications for American counterinsurgency efforts 
asserted that the creation of a political party in a host nation was essential to building 
support from those elements of the population that were formerly pro-insurgent or 
passive-neutral.89  The U.S. Counterinsurgency Field Manual dedicated a whole section to 
the importance of both “active” and “passive” supporters.  Known as FM 3-24, this part 
of the field manual recognizes that, just as Galula said in the 1960's, that “active internal 
support is usually the most important to an insurgent group.”90   Galula observed during 
his command in Algeria that most of the native populace remained neutral observers, 
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which in fact was the case in virtually every historical example of counterinsurgency 
before Algeria or since.91  While evidence of this went virtually unheeded before, Galula 
emphasized this aspect of revolutionary warfare. The costly wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan led American military strategists to show renewed interest in ideas of 
counterinsurgency. 
 Galula in his writings has also stressed the importance of institutionalizing a 
doctrine to serve as a template for combating insurgencies throughout the world.  
However, he has suggested that the application of such a doctrine should not be rigid 
because successful counterinsurgencies require dynamic, flexible leadership in order to 
deal with multifaceted problems.  He emphasized that  
There is clearly a need for a compass [regarding counterinsurgency], and 
this work [his book] has as its only purpose to construct such an 
instrument, however imperfect and rudimentary it may be. What we 
propose to is to define the laws of counterrevolutionary warfare, to 
deduce from them its principles, and to outline the corresponding 
strategy and tactics.92 
 
This is what led one later American military official to refer to Galula as “a 
comprehensive theorist. ”93 The Department of the Army's Tactics in Counterinsurgency 
field manual, has drawn the same conclusion as Galula, indicating that   “this manual 
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gives the U.S. Army a common language, concept, and purpose to fight and achieve 
success in a counterinsurgency.”94   
Perhaps Galula's most important contribution to the history of American 
counterinsurgency has been his views about what the central emphasis of such 
operations ought to be.  Thus, while the destruction of the enemy force is necessary and 
important, Galula emphasizes that it is not of primary importance relative to political 
endeavors.  He writes: 
The destruction of the guerrilla forces in the selected area is, obviously, 
highly desirable, and this is what the counterinsurgent must strive for.  
One thing should be clear, however: This operation is not an end in 
itself, for guerrillas, like the heads of the legendary hydra, have the 
special ability to grow again if not all destroyed at the same time. The 
real purpose of the first operation, then, is to prepare the stage for the 
further development of the counterinsurgent action.95 
 
With the Algerian War, and specifically Galula's observations in mind, the United States 
armed forces have reached the same conclusions.  Table 1-1 of the U.S. Army/ U.S. 
Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual lists an array of what it refers to as 
“Unsuccessful practice[s].” The first entry is: “Overemphasize killing and capturing the 
enemy rather than securing and engaging the populace.”96  A leading thinker on the 
topic of counterinsurgency stated, “What renders the U.S. military's experience with 
counterinsurgency so cyclical is its seeming inability to learn either from its lack of 
preparation...[and tendency] to revert instead to a singular focus on high-intensity 
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warfare.”97  These conclusions were inspired at least partially from David Galula's 
writings on the subject, as is confirmed by the field manual’s “selected bibliography.”98  
The juxtaposition of these quotes clearly indicates a strong link between the Algerian 
War, as interpreted by Galula, and the American military’s recently adopted 
counterinsurgency doctrine.  The United States is convinced, largely due to the 
prevailing interpretation of historical precedent and the circumstances of its recent 
counterinsurgency experiences, that the population is the key to success.  
 Galula's mark on American counterinsurgency policy is therefore unmistakable 
and he can be said to represent one of the “founding fathers” of modern doctrine, along 
with other leading thinkers on the topic such as Sir Robert Thompson.  This shows how 
the authors of the counterinsurgency doctrine from which American strategists have 
recently drawn their own ideas are not Americans, since, as previously discussed, 
American lessons from the Vietnam War were interpreted in such a way that led to the 
belief that counterinsurgency should be completely avoided.  In contrast, French and 
British thinkers retained much of their experience and attempted to make the lessons of 
places like Malaya and Algeria permanent.    
 The French counterinsurgent force failed, then, as American doctrine based in 
part on the writings of Galula has since stated, to “focus on the population, its needs and 
its security,” and because of this failure of the French they lost the war, despite their 
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military victory. 99  As previously stated, though French politicians considered Algeria to 
be a legitimate part of France instead of a colony, Algerians perceived the opposite 
because they were repeatedly denied equal treatment under French law.  This 
represented a key difference in perceptions between the French government and native 
Algerians, and led to ineffective political maneuvering by the French, as Algerians 
simply did not trust French promises of reform after so many failed attempts.  
Moreover, for their part, because many Frenchmen claimed they were extending the 
possibility of equality to Algerians, when the latter failed to be persuaded that they were 
in fact equal to Europeans, many French politicians were convinced that Muslim 
Algerians were an unreasonable opposition.   
 Eventually, American policy-makers took note of this and applied the lessons of 
the French blunder in arriving at their own doctrine.  An American military officer, 
writing a few years after the Second Gulf War, seemed to praise French tactics: 
Political and economic change allowed French forces to regain the 
initiative against the FLN/ALN by 1956. Many aspects of the French 
efforts were successful: dramatic increases in manpower, quadrillage and 
re-settlement removed portions of the population from the influence of 
the insurgents; the SAS deprived the insurgents of mobility and 
provided actionable intelligence for the French to exploit. These efforts 
showed the sustained attempts by the French to counter the problems of 
civil administration through other than military means.100 
 
The Major went on to note, however, that  
despite recognizing the importance of other than military efforts and the 
attendant paradox of COIN operations, the French Army could not gain 
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the confidence of enough Algerians to counter the political actions of the 
FLN/ALN.101 
 
The implications of this assessment for counterinsurgency theory are tremendous.  It 
suggests that an implementation of a seemingly effective strategy—one that obeys 
Galula's “laws” and is employed by a nation possessing extensive resources—can prove 
worthless in a counterinsurgency if it does recognize as its central objective the active 
participation of the population.  Therefore, the truly important battle is fought in the 
realm of ideas, culture and perception where convincing is more important than killing.  
This maxim, often contested by military commanders throughout the history of 
counterinsurgency, lies at the heart of the tension between military tradition and 
military innovation. 
 One of the most important lessons of the Algerian War has been the importance 
of the cultural intelligence and awareness of the soldiers and commanders of the 
counterinsurgent force. Specifically, cultural intelligence refers to an understanding of 
the values, political habits, perceptions, and social tendencies of a particular population 
group.  The needs, concerns and desires of a particular culture are usually at the root of 
its political issues.  Since counterinsurgency is itself a political endeavor, such an 
appreciation is crucial. This lesson has not been lost on military planners.  The 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual states:  
Cultural awareness has become an increasingly important 
concept...[military officers] study major world cultures and put a 
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priority on learning the details of the new operational environment 
when deployed. Different solutions are required in different cultural 
contexts.... Like all other competencies, cultural awareness requires 
self-awareness, self-directed learning, and adaptability.102 
 
In Algeria, many French, especially the pieds noirs, openly displayed their contempt for 
Muslim society or culture.   This is a another lesson that American doctrine has 
incorporated from this conflict.  In a 2005 report written for the U.S. Army War College, 
Karl Goetzke, in a section entitled A review of the Algerian War of National Liberation Using 
the U.S. Army’s Current Counterinsurgency Doctrine, observes:  
While limited concessions were made [by the French government to 
the Muslim Algerians], they were insufficient to assuage pent-up 
demands of the indigenous people of Algeria.  An extremely violent 
French response to a terrorist incident that occurred on VE day 
further fanned the flames of discord. By 1954 the simmering conflict 
came to a boil. The indigenous people of Algeria lost confidence in 
their ability to achieve self-determination through political dialogue 
with France. Instead, military action, coupled with diplomatic 
outreach efforts to the international community, was embraced as a 
solution to their predicament.103 
 
As this quote suggests, the lack of cultural awareness by French soldiers and officers 
limited their ability to readily identify the “population's grievances,” a topic which is 
listed as imperative by the counterinsurgency field manual.104   
 Ken Booth, in his prescient work Strategy and Enthnocentrism, ironically 
published in 1979 during the Iranian Revolt, has similarly argued the strategic 
importance of taking into consideration the understanding of an opposing culture.  
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Booth argues that such considerations are central to the success or failure of political 
stability operations.  “When ethnocentrism interferes with knowing the enemy,” he 
writes, “various unfortunate political and/or military consequences may follow,” and he 
lists these as “misplaced confidence,” “misplaced suspicion,” “surprise,” “inflexibility,” 
“rigidity in crisis,” and “self-fulfilling prophecies.”105  Such theories seem especially 
fitting not only to the French experience in Algeria but to nearly every 
counterinsurgency since.  This was already the case of 19th Century Algeria when French 
ethnocentrism led to the abrupt forced dissolution of traditional power bases in Algerian 
culture. Thus, the governor-general of Algeria in 1894, as Alistair Horne has pointed out, 
complained of the “consequences” of the “French policy of breaking up the great 
traditional families of Algeria,...”  Horne quoted Jules Cambon, 
[this policy was undertaken] because we found them to be forces of 
resistance. We did not realise [sic] that in suppressing the forces of resistance 
in this fashion, we were also suppressing our means of action.  The result is 
that we are today confronted by a sort of human dust on which we have no 
influence and in which movements take place which are to us unknown.106 
 
Failure to craft policy that reflected an appreciation of the importance of traditional 
social and political structures had enormous implications for the revolution and the 
counterrevolution in Algeria, and this logic still applies today.  Examples of 
counterinsurgent forces dissolving the existing power structures in host nations has 
consistently led to negative results.  An analysis of these examples prompted the 
inclusion of section 5-71 of the counterinsurgency field manual: “Population control 
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includes determining who lives in an area and what they do.  This task requires 
determining societal relationships-- family, clan, tribe, interpersonal, and 
professional.”107  Undoubtedly, the Algerian example was important in the development 
of this conclusion. 
 David Galula makes this point when he recalled a conversation he had with a 
soldier under his command in Algeria.  Galula was attempting to explain the need to 
focus on the population as the objective, which meant listening to them and treating 
them well.  This proved to be a difficult task, he recalled, as the soldier responded, “Sir, 
these Kabyle people (ethnic group in Algeria), they are all bastards, they are all 
hypocrites, they all support the rebels.”108  This type of attitude is common with many 
young soldiers who have a limited perspective due to a lack of familiarity with other 
cultures.  Galula responded to the soldier: 
Our job is precisely to stop this support. If we lump together all rebels--
and this is what the FLN want us to do--we are sure to keep the 
population supporting them.  If we distinguish between people and 
rebels, then we have a chance.... My rules are: outwardly you must treat 
every civilian as a friend; inwardly you must consider him a rebel ally 
until you have positive proof on the contrary.109  
 
 Many American military leaders have slowly incorporated the same logic and 
especially the importance of cultural intelligence.  In a 2003 report for the Joint Forces 
Staff College, written during the early stages of what was to become a paroxysm of 
insurgent violence and general lawlessness in Iraq, its authors criticized the 
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shortcomings of the then-prevailing concept of “winning over the hearts and minds” as 
the catchall key to victory.  However, they admitted its essential importance.    
Many roadblocks exist to winning the hearts and minds in post-war Iraq: 
the most important is American ethnocentrism.  U.S. soldiers and 
statesmen generally lack understanding of the Arab worldview....  Part of 
America's inability to persuade the Iraqis derives from their very 
foreignness and America's inability to fully understand their psychology.  
Only Arabs fully understand their own paradigm, but cultural training 
could help American occupiers to be more attuned to Arab sensibilities.110 
 
A 2008 study on “Successful Revolutionary Movements” by Raymond Millen for the 
American Strategic Studies Institute represents yet another link between the Algerian 
War and the current view of the U.S. military regarding soldiers’ and planners’ cultural 
awareness and the importance of perceptions.  In a section with the heading, “State 
sponsorship or protection of unpopular economic and social arrangements or cultural 
institutions,” Millen noted of the Algerian War that the stage was set before the 
revolution ever started for a widening gap in perceptions because of the failure the 
French to translate their good intentions into good legislation.  Specifically, he pointed 
out the inefficiency of relying heavily on unpopular “intermediaries”— pro-French 
Muslims and Harkis--within Muslim society.  This coupled with “the paltry number of 
French administrators,” who were “over-worked and understaffed” and had “little 
contact with the populace,” put the French in a dangerous political situation.111  This can 
largely be attributed, he noted, to a lack of cultural intelligence, and the failure of the 
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French to appreciate the importance of understanding and then utilizing the host 
nation's former, internal political power structures.  The United States has since 
attempted to learn from this example.  Millen quoted in this regard Alistair Horne's 
observation that “the tragedy of the Algerian Insurgency might have been averted had 
the French shown 'a little more magnanimity, [and] a little more trust, moderation and 
compassion.’”112   
 The role that international and French domestic politics played in the context of 
the Algerian War was also crucially important.  In fact, much of the tangled confusion of 
French domestic politics during the Algerian War undercut the effectiveness of French 
military policy.  While the problem of the pieds noirs may be unique to the French 
predicament in Algeria, as the colonists, who were full French citizens, held such a 
commanding position in Algeria, the obstacle they represented for the French during the 
counterinsurgency does provide lessons for others.  For instance, French political 
disunity, and a general lack of a cohesive national will, prompted at least in part by the 
actions of the pieds noirs, illustrates the obstacles that politically powerful third parties 
can pose for liberal governments in attempting to deal with protracted, costly wars of 
insurrection. David Galula explained the importance of the political situation in France 
this way: 
Instability and paralysis of the government had been the dominant feature 
of political life in France, at least since the end of World War II. Parliament 
had become the real source of power.  There, a cluster of small democratic 
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parties, united against the Communists on the far left and against the 
Gaullists on the right, sometimes combined but more often competed for 
the privilege of running the government.  A parliamentary majority could 
always be found for any problem, but when the problem changed, the 
majority changed with it, so that long-term, coherent policy was impossible 
to formulate—much less to implement.  Short-lived cabinets built on 
precarious coalitions succeeded each other, often after a long crisis, and fell 
apart after the first serious hurdle.113 
 
This explains perfectly the situation in France that made it difficult for the various 
governments of the Fourth Republic to deal with effectively with the pieds noirs or the 
situation in Algeria. Writing nearly half of a century later for the Strategic Studies 
Institute, Raymond Millen observed “moreover, the frequent shuffling of government 
officials undercut a coherent and consistent policy towards Algeria,” which suggests a 
strong link between the French situation in the 1950s and American counterinsurgency 
doctrine in the 21st century.114  Such a shuffling of governments reflects a lock of political 
will, which made it difficult to prosecute a war.  This is true for modern democracies as 
well, especially with irregular wars in which progress is slow and objectives are usually 
inherently nebulous.  By the 21st century, many military experts more thoroughly 
embraced the principle that military operations be planned with political objectives and 
popular support in mind. As the U.S. Army/ Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual explains the “political” element in military operations: 
At the strategic level, gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for a 
protracted deployment is critical. Only the most senior military officers are 
involved in this process at all.  It is properly a political activity.  However, 
military leaders typically take care to ensure that their actions and statements 
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are forthright.  They also ensure that the conduct of operations neither makes it 
harder for elected leaders to maintain public support nor undermine public 
confidence.115 
 
Such a comment's inclusion in official U.S. military doctrine is surprising given the 
military’s long-standing position of keeping politics and military operations separate.  
The experience of wars involving insurgency has brought about a change in military 
thinking, one in which so far as conflict situations are concerned, has seen as impossible 
to separate the fighting of a modern war from political concerns.     
 Just as domestic support is crucial, international politics has also come to play an 
important role in counterinsurgency strategy after the Algerian War.  As Millen notes, 
“The French did not appreciate the power of the media, particularly film footage and 
photos, in defending its policies, and lost an important front in the war.”116  International 
opinion in fact became progressively more critical of the French actions in Algeria, at the 
very time the FLN was committing terrible atrocities of its own; the critical focus of the 
world, however, was squarely on France.  This point has become even more important 
in the early 21st century in an age of unprecedented global interconnectedness.  “The 
advent of global media has only compounded the problem,” a recent RAND research 
document has noted, “enemy propagandists have a field day when COIN forces kill or 
injure innocent people.”117  Much as David Galula argued, when a powerful democracy 
kills innocent people, the world pays extremely close attention, which can easily lead to 
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pressure and even condemnation.  The U.S. military has accepted this assessment.  
Millen, in summarizing the U.S. interpretation of the issue, writes: “Algeria had made 
France one of the most reviled members in the U.N., prompting de Gaulle to seek an end 
to the war, even if under less than ideal conditions.”118  The Algerian War is a perfect 
example of the effect international opinion can have on the ability of a nation to 
successfully defeat insurgencies.  This is true not only in the conduct of war but of 
organizing coalitions, which has become an increasingly important element in recent 
wars.  The invasion of Iraq in 2003 demonstrates this, but as one multinational research 
study done on coalition warfare indicated, coalitions “have played an increasingly 
prominent role in international security policy since the end of the Cold War.”119  A 
hostile international attitude, as the French interpreted during their war in Algeria, 
posed serious problems in such protracted hostilities, much as others since have 
similarly experienced.  
 A 2007 thesis for the Command and General Staff College, comparing the French 
practices in the Algerian War and the U.S. doctrine as described in the 
counterinsurgency field manual, stresses the awareness of international opinion in 
counterinsurgency operations that American operations must incorporate: 
French political and military leaders repeatedly argued against any 
outside involvement in what they believed to be an internal issue... The 
continued reporting by the FLN and other groups of the atrocities, 
brutality, and repression of rights of Algerians were put forth in highly 
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public forums like the UN, and continued to tarnish France's claim to 
their legitimate role of maintaining Algeria as a part of the republic.  
French dialogue with other nations on Algeria did not exist, and they 
never publicly addressed the issues of repression colonialism.  These 
actions caused French operations to lose legitimacy.  Strife in France 
increased over the course of the direction of the conflict, and world 
opinion turned against the perceived colonial policies of France.120 
 
While this passage lacks depth and a thorough historical perspective, it does indicate 
what some American military officers believed they had learned from the Algerian War: 
that modern military operations must pay close attention to international perceptions of 
military operations.  As the counterinsurgency manual states:  
The omnipresence and global reach of today's news media affects the 
conduct of military operations more than ever before... Insurgents use 
terrorist tactics to produce graphics that they hope will influence public 
opinion—both locally and globally.121   
 
In this way, the United States became committed to avoiding the international backlash 
that the French suffered during their counterinsurgency in Algeria. 
 The United States military, as indicated by its current counterinsurgency field 
manual, (among various other relevant publications discussed in this chapter) 
developed its counterinsurgency doctrine with several historical precedents in mind.  
The Algerian War, in particular, offered the United States exceptionally important 
lessons regarding the prerequisite necessity for a viable political solution during any 
counterinsurgency.  The French failure, despite military success, provides an exceptional 
lesson which has been incorporated directly into American doctrine.   
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OLD DOGS AND NEW TRICKS: THE DELICATE NATURE OF COMBAT AND 
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 
The United States cannot afford to take the attitude that civilian casualties are  
unfortunate but unavoidable.  Expressions of regret cannot repair the political 
damage caused by harming people whom U.S. troops are supposed to protect. 
When the U.S. military is entrusted with responsibility for security in another 
country, that country's inhabitants should be accorded the same protection from 
death and injury that Americans enjoy at home.  A lower standard is 
indefensible on strategic, political, and logical grounds.122 
 
 The tactics of military operations involved in counterinsurgencies are, as 
previously stated, profoundly different from the tactics of conventional warfare.  
When conducting counterinsurgencies, militaries must account for their own 
weaknesses and the strengths of the enemy, and devise strategies consistent with 
whatever conclusions they reach.  In many ways, the French destruction of the FLN 
during the Algerian War was a textbook case in how to neutralize a guerrilla enemy, 
though with a few important caveats, as this chapter will elucidate.  This chapter will 
focus on three key areas, based on the works of American military officers and experts, 
which illustrate the way the Algerian War directly affected the U.S. military approaches 
to counterinsurgency operations.  These particular aspects focus on how careful modern 
counterinsurgency forces must be in carrying out their military operations.  While there 
are several military lessons from the Algerian War that deal specifically with how best to 
destroy the enemy force, this chapter will focus on the modern necessity of conducting 
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counterinsurgency operations that cause minimum harm to the target population.  This 
is important so that the cooperation of the population—the central objective in American 
counterinsurgency doctrine—can be achieved.  The overarching theme in this chapter 
focuses on the way the American military has adjusted its fundamental approach to 
military operations in support of counterinsurgencies, making them population-centric, 
rather than myopically focused on the destruction of the enemy.  U.S. naval officer 
Robert Riggs, writing for the Naval War College, organized his four lessons as: the 
importance of “Psychological Operations,” “Human Intelligence,” “Employment of 
Forces,” and a “Measured Response,” which will be explained later. 123   This chapter 
will adopt a similar organization and examine three essential lessons learned by the 
American armed forces: the primacy of intelligence, the importance of engaging in an 
appropriate use of force, and the emphasis on psychological warfare.  
 Counterinsurgency, as has been mentioned, is primarily a political endeavor, but 
military operations are a necessary and significant part, as physical security is required 
for those entities tasked with the establishment of political stability.  As the 
counterinsurgency field manual makes clear, it is imperative to “establish and expand 
secure areas.”124  Political measures alone will not initially secure anything or anyone, 
even if such measures represent the ultimate basis of permanent, lasting security.  Once 
elements of an insurgency establish their control over a certain area, the 
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counterinsurgents must use force in order to take control back.  Naturally, this force 
must occur within close proximity to the very populace the counterinsurgents hope to 
win over.  Whether purposefully or accidentally, killing members of the target 
population undermines any effort to persuade them to cooperate with the government.  
Therefore, great effort must go into keeping the non-insurgent population safe from 
violence.  Historically, this has been an extremely difficult task and virtually impossible 
to do perfectly, as collateral damage eventually occurs.  The extreme difficulty of 
avoiding this, coupled with the U.S. military's objective to win over the population, 
explains why this matter is so important to the United States military.  As this chapter 
will demonstrate, the experience of the Algerian War has heavily influenced the current 
U.S. military's perception of the importance of what is termed “appropriate use of 
force.” 
 Fighting a war is necessarily a violent, brutal endeavor.  Regardless of 
technological advances, the essence of war is the killing of other human beings.  Such 
brutality has become more and more loathsome to the populations of liberal 
democracies.  While war is certainly not an extinct endeavor, the ability of liberal states 
to maintain public support for protracted, costly wars diminished during the 20th 
century.  While clear, rational objectives and demonstrated success can alleviate such 
inherent difficulties, the particular nature of counterinsurgency warfare brings with it a 
different set of obstacles.  Therefore, it is extremely important for modern states to 
maximize their military efficiency by killing more of the enemy and fewer innocent 
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civilians.  Additionally, it is crucial for states to practice internationally acceptable 
methods and follow international rules of warfare even if the United States military 
believes that “the contest of [this type of] war is not 'fair;' [and] many of the 'rules' favor 
insurgents.”125   
 One aspect of counterinsurgency that is crucial is intelligence.  An article entitled, 
“Intelligent Design: COIN Operations and Intelligence Collection and Analysis” 
concludes that  
In COIN, the environment is as important as the enemy, because the neutral 
majority, the center of gravity, resides there.  COIN requires an appreciation 
of cultures, religions, tribes, classes, ethnicities, and languages, so that the 
people will view U.S. forces and their own government positively and work 
against an insurgency.  Consequently most intelligence is collected by 
human intelligence.126  
 
Even before the Algerian War France recognized that intelligence was vital to combating 
an insurgency.  One of the “forgotten successes” of the French in Southeast Asia is the 
very accurate intelligence they gathered despite unfavorable conditions.  Dien Bien Phu, 
the famous military defeat of the French by the Vietminh, Alexander Zervoudakis has 
noted, came about more as a result of political meddling than a failure of military 
intelligence.127  Continuing their habit of putting a high priority on good intelligence into 
the Algerian War, French forces during the Battle of Algiers were quite successful in 
piecing together an accurate picture of the FLN network, and eventually bringing the 
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group to its knees.  French intelligence even went as far as to follow closely several key 
FLN members in New York City.128  One especially memorable element of French 
intelligence is the way in which it was willing to use torture to derive information.  
However, regardless of the methods the French used to gather information, which are 
discussed in greater detail later in the chapter, the priority they gave to intelligence, and 
its tremendous impact on the destruction of the FLN, demonstrates how essential such a 
priority is in counterinsurgency warfare. 
 As David Galula pointed out in Algeria, borrowing from Mao Tse-tung, “[the 
Algerians were] Moslems, and we were not.  The rebel fish could swim better in Moslem 
water than the counterinsurgent land mammal.”129  Therefore, it was imperative for the 
counterinsurgent forces to obtain as clear and realistic a picture of the “Muslim sea” as 
possible.   The French realized their innate disadvantages were thus aggressive in their 
efforts to obtain knowledge of the FLN's tactics, its patterns, its composition, its 
operational strength, and the relationship it had with the population.  Methods of 
obtaining useful information about an enemy that are more significant in conventional 
wars are signals intelligence (interception of electronic communication between different 
enemy elements) and airborne intelligence (using airpower to catch a glimpse of the 
physical presence and movements of the enemy).  While the French put these methods 
to use and achieved some observable results, in Algeria, the more useful form of 
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intelligence was “human intelligence.”  Human intelligence refers to information that is 
obtained from individuals who are involved with the conflict that may be useful to the 
counterinsurgent force.  Sir Robert Thompson explains the purpose and objectives of this 
kind of intelligence in wars involving insurgencies:  
Whatever the circumstances of the insurgency, there will nearly always be 
some people who are prepared to surrender for one reason or another and 
join the government side. Well-treated and carefully interrogated, 
sometimes over a long period, they reveal a tremendous amount of 
information. A situation gradually develops whereby any later individual 
who is captures or surrenders can be interrogated on the basis of a mass of 
information already available to the intelligence organization. This shocks 
the truth out of him far more effectively than torture.130 
 
More recently, an American military research report, drawing upon the French 
experience, explained:  
The key to an effective HUMINT [human intelligence] capability is to 
foster trust and build relationships with the local population.  As these 
relationships grow and the local population recognizes that the insurgents 
are a greater threat than the military, and that the military is capable and 
willing to protect them, they will come forward and deliver intelligence.  
The French found this to be true as their HUNINT network strengthened 
in proportion to their ability to understand and work with the local 
population.131 
 
Even though American military thinkers concluded that torture was counterproductive 
to overall counterinsurgency efforts they still saw the French as an example to follow in 
other aspects of their human intelligence gathering.  
 Because they lack the resources of conventional armies, insurgent groups 
generally adopt different methods, which conventional military forces like the French in 
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Algeria are not trained sufficiently to deal with.  Most of the time, these methods involve 
the pre-planned killing of civilians and other brutal atrocities, such as the setif massacres.  
When, in response, developed states partake in similar methods and tactics they likely 
suffer from international backlash, like official condemnation which may damage that 
nation's image; at least this was the fear of de Gaulle's administration during the 
Algerian War which why international opinion contributed to the cessation of the 
French effort to retain Algeria.  This helps explain why France's military success did not 
translate into final victory as de Gaulle ordered France out of Algeria with international 
opinion in mind.  The French example in Algeria taught that regardless of the methods 
that insurgents were willing to use, the counterinsurgent force was held responsible for 
its actions and must live up to the national standards they profess.  As Sir Robert 
Thompson explains:  
There is a very strong temptation in dealing both with terrorism and with 
guerrilla actions for government forces to act outside the law, the excuses 
being that the processes of law are too cumbersome, that the normal 
safeguards in the law for the individual are not designed for an 
insurgency and that a terrorist deserves to be treated as an outlaw 
anyway. Not only is this morally wrong, but, over a period, it will create 
more practical difficulties for a government than it solves. A government 
which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be 
called a government and cannot then expect its people to obey the law.132  
 
While Thompson's observation was not derived specifically from the Algerian War, its 
logic fits the lessons the Americans have derived from both Thompson and the French 
experience in Algeria.   
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 The advantage in this respect was with the insurgents, for as Galula puts it, “The 
insurgent, having no responsibility, is free to use every trick; if necessary, he can lie, 
cheat, exaggerate.”133  Even if Galula's claims are somewhat disingenuous, the FLN could 
murder its own civilians, as it did, with few or no real international repercussions, while 
French prestige would take a serious blow from revelations of torture. This meant that 
the FLN simply had to “wait it out” as the populations of larger democracies—in the 
court of international opinion—grew critical and the French themselves grew weary of 
war and became more divided on the use of torture.  Such was the case in the Algerian 
War: the FLN hoped its terrorism would induce French reprisals, which would bring 
forth international condemnation of the French, and thus obviate its significant military 
and economic advantages.  One such atrocity occurred in May of 1956, when French 
special forces responded to the death of two of their own by killing nearly 80 Muslims in 
a Turkish bath. None of the French troops were held responsible for the massacre.  Such 
actions, the American naval officer Robert Riggs, has pointed out, only fueled the fire of 
the insurgency and improved the FLN's position in the international arena.”134  
 One of the salient memories of the Algerian War that shapes its legacy and has 
affected the debate on counterinsurgencies today is the French army's recourse to torture 
as a means of gathering information.  Torture was justified by French commanders, and 
it seems to have greatly enhanced the ability of French authorities to gain valuable 
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intelligence on the FLN.135  During the Battle of Algiers, several methods of torture were 
extensively employed which have since been condemned.  The adoption of torture has, 
and remains, a subject of much discussion and disagreement.  Torture is also, of course, 
a matter of definition. What is acceptable?  What makes one method unacceptable but 
another acceptable?   Wuillaume, a French senior civil servant, endorsed certain forms of 
torture, contending that they were effective and “no more brutal than deprivation of 
food, drink, and tobacco, which is always been accepted.”  Among the methods he 
accepted included “water and electricity methods provided they are carefully used.”  He 
reasoned that they would “produce a shock which is more psychological than physical 
and therefore do not constitute excessive cruelty.”  There was also the method of 
“suspending two men completely naked by their feet, their hands bound behind their 
backs and plunging their heads for a long time into a bucket of water to make them 
talk.”136  Several individuals within the American military, as will be evidenced later in 
this chapter, argued that such methods, while justified by many French soldiers and 
leaders, greatly contributed to the erosion of public support for the war. 
 General Massu, the commander of French paras—the elite paratrooper unit 
deployed to exterminate the FLN—during the Battle of Algiers—as even that film 
reveals, was not the monster some suggested, or a commander who relished torturing 
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prisoners.  Rita Maran's work Torture: The Role of Ieology in the French Algerian War, 
cogently lays bare the predicament Massu found himself in. 
Mutilations carried out by the FLN and its supporters were atrocities that 
qualified as private acts of torture.  Massu was responsible, as military 
commander in Algiers, for the protection of its inhabitants and was especially 
concerned with stopping these particular acts of terrorism.... [Among the evidence 
of atrocities committed by the FLN were] Children wounded by gunshot because 
they continued to attend school...men whose nose and lips were sliced off because 
they did not honor the FLN interdiction against smoking...families whose dead 
bodies were lumped together in horrible resemblance to...concentration camp 
atrocities.  Against such atrocities Massu acted in accordance with what he 
considered the responsibilities of his post. The great mass of Muslim Algerians 
whom he respected and wished to protect were, he said, his major consideration 
as governor of Algiers.  As for the small segment among them who were terrorists 
and rebels, he was not constrained from taking reciprocal action against them.”137 
 
Such logic is attractive to those “on the ground” in Algeria, like Massu, who had the 
responsibility of defeating the insurgency.  However, as history generally and the 
Algerian War specifically taught the American military, in the long run torture does 
more harm that good. Albert Camus, the brilliant novelist and eminent French 
intellectual who sympathized with the plight of Muslim Algerians, said that, “torture 
has perhaps saved some at the expense of honour, by uncovering thirty bombs, but at 
the same time it created fifty new terrorists, who operating in some other way and in 
another place, would cause the death of even more innocent people.”138   An American 
officer has similarly noted in 2007 that the French suffered from their “misuse of force 
when they used torture” because “inappropriate tactics and disproportionate use of 
force could backfire, turn the population against the counterinsurgent and create an 
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environment ripe for recruitment by the insurgents.”139  Even if it were provable that 
torture leads to short-term intelligence breakthroughs, given the objective of 
counterinsurgency warfare of winning over the civilian populace, torture is now 
considered by many counterproductive. 
 The effectiveness of torture as a method of intelligence gathering is presently a 
matter of heated debate and differing opinions.140  In a recent study of the Algerian War, 
by a “consultant to the Social Science Department” of the RAND Corporation the author 
asserts for example that torture, despite its alleged moral problems, actually has 
produced observable results. “Whatever the moral judgment of such methods may be,” 
the report indicates, “the extreme effectiveness of those offensive operations which 
resort to them is undeniable.”  The report concludes that intelligence directly resulting 
from torture contributed more than anything else to the destruction of the FLN.  
However the reports also warns that “the difficulties and inconveniences of such 
operations must not be overlooked.... such methods cannot be used without shocking 
the population itself... one may ask if, in the long run, the negative feelings thus 
repressed are not reasserted to the benefit of the rebellion.”141  So while there exists a 
legitimate debate regarding the efficacy of such methods, torture has been largely 
rejected as an acceptable action by the United States military. 
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 Comparing the current U.S. attitude towards the use of torture to that of the 
French in Algeria, an American major has written: 
Much of the French failures can be attributed to the tactical methods 
employed that, despite success, resulted in strategic failure. FM 3-24 [the 
counterinsurgency field manual] devotes a chapter to addressing the legal 
considerations and ethical actions required in a counterinsurgency.  U.S. 
doctrine clearly articulates the importance of adherence to strict guidelines of 
international law, U.S. policy and regulation, and legal precedence.  The 
French did not address such considerations. In many cases, they attempted 
to justify their actions by citing the nature of the enemy and enemy terror 
tactics. The French suspended the rights of the individual in their single-
minded pursuit of the FLN/ALN.142 
 
While there is still considerable debate on the subject, there has thus recently emerged 
an acknowledgment of the long-term, negative effects that torture can have on 
counterinsurgency operations, which has been reinforced and enhanced by the French 
experience in the Algerian War.  The U.S. counterinsurgency field manual dedicates an 
entire section on the French decision to use torture during the Algerian War. There it 
notes,   
This official condoning of torture on the part of the French Army leadership 
had several negative consequences.  It empowered the moral legitimacy of 
the opposition, undermined the French moral legitimacy, and caused 
internal fragmentations among serving officers that led to an unsuccessful 
coup attempt in 1962.  In the end, failure to comply with moral and legal 
restrictions against torture severely undermined French efforts and 
contributed to their loss despite several significant military victories.  Illegal 
and immoral activities made the counterinsurgents extremely vulnerable to 
enemy propaganda inside Algeria among the Muslim population, as well as 
in the United Nations and the French Media.  These actions also degraded 
the ethical climate throughout the French Army.  France eventually 
recognized Algerian independence in July 1963.143 
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The United States military's current official stance on torture in support of 
counterinsurgencies is as follows: 
Abuse of detained persons is immoral, illegal, and unprofessional.  Those who 
engage in cruel or inhuman treatment of prisoners betray the standards of the 
profession of arms and U.S. laws. They are subject to punishment under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice.  The Geneva Conventions, as well as the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, agree on unacceptable interrogating techniques.  
Torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is never a morally 
permissible option, even if the lives depend on gaining information. No 
exceptional circumstances permit the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment.144 
 
This conclusion by the U.S. military is the result of a progression, even since 2001, that is 
characterized by shying progressively away from such methods.  It is likely that the 
“lessons” of Algeria regarding torture have been retroactively embraced after the United 
States' own encounters with related controversy.  The lesson here seems clear, that while 
the justification that French political and military leaders used for the torture of FLN 
suspects may have seemed reasonable and justifiable at the time, the American view is 
that it led to bad policy, and contributed to national failure.    
 Psychological war is a crucial aspect of military operations in support of 
counterinsurgency.  Psychological operations revolve around the conviction that the 
primary objective is the cooperation of the population.  As this thesis has argued, 
counterinsurgency is in its core objective a political endeavor.  This means that all 
military actions in support of this political mission must be designed to affect change 
that is productive to that end.  Therefore, force that may destroy the enemy is necessary, 
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but only if such actions do not send many of the neutral population into the waiting 
arms of the insurgency.  A RAND report written shortly after the Algerian War 
proposed a useful hypothetical scenario. 
With the population entirely and profoundly on the side of the established 
power, one could consider the problem of insurgency solved. Under such 
conditions the counterinsurgent forces benefit from the information required 
to localize armed rebel bands and identify the members of their political 
organizations.  Terrorism and secrecy remain the only tactical weapons of the 
insurgents, who have no opportunity to carry out their political strategy.145   
   
Therefore, a proverbial tight-rope must be walked between not using enough force, 
which would fail to provide the security necessary for political gains, and too much 
force which would drive the “prize” of the battle, the population, away from the kind of 
active participation Galula deemed essential to success.   
 The Algerian War is perhaps the best demonstration of this concept in 20th-
century history, even though for many and complex reasons, it was not successful.  The 
1964 RAND report on the Algerian War, cited above, argues that “it is indispensable for 
the counterinsurgents to act psychologically on the population... revolutionary warfare 
must be considered with certain reservations.” The report continues,  “...some French 
theoreticians go so far as to claim that psychological action on the population is alone 
important, that the destruction of the rebel para-military forces is only secondary since it 
is influenced by the effectiveness of the measures taken to conquer the masses... and that 
the only effective methods are those used by the rebellion itself.”  However, the author 
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concludes that such thinking is “more theoretical than practical,” as the 
counterinsurgent military “engaged in hard daily combat... cannot wait for the 
problematic effects of psychological action on the population.”146  While this report and 
current American doctrine do not disagree with the assessment that psychological 
warfare is of crucial importance, neither sees it as a replacement for military action 
altogether.  United States doctrine itself is clear on this.   
Executing a COIN operation is complex, demanding, and tedious.  There are 
no simple, quick solutions.  Success often seems elusive.  However, 
contributing to the complexity of the problem is the manner in which 
counterinsurgents view the environment and how they define success.  The 
specific design of the COIN operation and the manner in which it is executed 
must be based on a holistic treatment of the environment and remain focused 
on the commander's intent and end state.  Success requires unity of effort 
across all LLOs (logical line of operations) to achieve objectives that 
contribute to the desired end state—establishing legitimacy and gaining 
popular support for the host nation government.  Operational design and 
execution cannot really be separated.  They are both part of the same 
whole.147 
 
But although military actions are necessary, they must conform to a set of rules that 
precludes them from detracting from the psychological effort.  Therefore, operations that 
may appear to be purely military, such as search-and-destroy missions, are both 
inherently political and psychological in this context.  This means that combat must 
achieve a positive psychological impact.  For instance, an operation that kills twelve 
insurgents and contributes to the security of a certain Algerian village without killing 
civilians or destroying much property is considered ideal.  Conversely, an operation that 
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kills or captures one hundred insurgents, but destroys a town full of neutral citizens 
ends up causing more harm than good.  While all of this may seem to make 
counterinsurgency an exercise in futility, the RAND report cited above on the 
counterinsurgency lessons of the Algerian War, offers a way to avoid these problems, 
which represents how American military strategists approach the “mistakes” made by 
the French.  
By rendering participation in the rebellion optional through protection of 
the population, by proving to the masses through spectacular military 
victories that armed struggle is impossible, by demonstrating through 
success and an unshakable will that the rebellion is not and never will be 
rewarding, and by eliminating the negative feelings and satisfying the 
positive aspirations of the inhabitants in order to make them understand 
that rebellion is useless, the counterinsurgents can put into practice 
numerous methods of psychological action on the population and thwart 
those which are being used by the rebellion .148 
 
Thus, in a war that is more about convincing than killing, military actions must be 
conceived and carried out in such a way that takes into consideration their psychological 
implications on host nation population it impacts.  
 Another aspect of the Algerian War that has served as a lesson for American 
military thinkers is the practice of collective punishment, which is the practice of 
targeting large groups of likely innocent people with the assumption that there will 
likely be a few insurgents among them.  Such a practice ignores one of the central rules 
of counterinsurgency:  the necessity of gaining the population's support.  There are few 
better ways to lose support than to round up or kill large numbers of people, many of 
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whom may be innocent.  As Alistair Horne has written of the tactics employed by the 
French units,  
On the ground, the physical reaction–or over-reaction–was predictable.  It 
was predictable, not specifically because of the pieds noir mentality, but 
because this is the way an administration caught with its pants down 
habitually reacts under such circumstances... First comes the mass 
indiscriminate round-up of suspects, most of them innocent but converted 
into ardent militants by the fact of their imprisonment; then the setting of 
faces against liberal reforms designed to tackle the root of the trouble; 
followed, finally, when too late, by a new, progressive policy of 
liberalization.149  
 
The reforms nearly always came too late and in too feeble form to pacify people so 
indiscriminately dealt with. Horne makes the same point when he notes:   
[T]he French Conseil-General for the department of Algiers... voted unanimously: 
that order be firmly and rapidly restored...that the guilty, whoever they are, be 
exemplarily punished... that, henceforth, no weakness be tolerated... and that 
French Policy... be founded upon the healthy elements of the population.150 
 
Such actions, according to Horne worked against the efforts of those in the French 
government sympathetic to the Muslim Algerians' plight who pushed for political 
reform that might have created support for the French and the maintenance of their rule 
in Algeria. 
 In terms of the American military's interpretation of the French use of collective 
punishment, one American officer has written, “Rationalizing the extreme circumstances 
warranted extreme countermeasures... General Jacques Massau, [sic] authorized 
wholesale round-ups of entire neighborhoods in addition to extrajudicial preemptive 
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detentions of FLN suspects.” These actions, “lacked the foresight of the second and third 
order effects and consequences as a result of their military actions.”151  The lessons from 
the French practice of collective punishment are firmly entrenched in American 
doctrine, as is seen in the sensitivity American planners have emphasized in planning 
military operations and their effect on the target population.  Being too harsh can turn 
neutral members of the population away, while being too soft can cause the population 
to doubt the resolve of the counterinsurgent force.  Successful military endeavors must 
balance the two.  A juxtapositioning of the two current methods “cordoning and 
entering” and “cordoning and knocking” offer interesting insight into the appreciation 
the United States has for the importance of winning over the population.  Both of the 
above concepts are subsets of “cordon and search” operations, which are “conducted to 
seal of an area in order to search it for persons or things such as items, intelligence data, 
or answers to priority intelligence requirements.”152   Cordoning and entering involves a 
certain risk level for soldiers, and is authorized when intelligence demands extra 
security.  “Cordon and knock... is less intrusive than cordon and search.  It is used when 
the populace is seen as friendly or neutral, when no resistance is expected, and when the 
goal is to disrupt and inconvenience the occupants as little as possible.”153  
 This policy represents a tremendous departure from the attitude of “collective 
responsibility” that the French followed during certain, sometimes critical points in the 
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Algerian War.  While this practice was not commonplace throughout the war's duration, 
its occurrences were frequent enough to warrant analysis and adjustments on 
application when American planners evolved their counterinsurgency doctrine.  The 
Algerian War offered a unique lesson for others.   Because the military is the designated 
entity to conduct counterinsurgencies, and its tradition and history are characterized by 
a strong preference for conventional warfare, coupled with a tradition of conservatism 
and resistance to anything that may threaten that tendency, counterinsurgency has been 
a problematic endeavor.  All of which makes historical examples like the Algerian War 
particularly important for military situations that involve counterinsurgency.  This has 
been especially true for the American military and explains the attention the Algerian 














The nature of modern counterinsurgencies, as previously discussed, has changed 
over time.  So while the U.S. military has an established doctrine, meant to be utilized in 
any counterinsurgency, it also recognizes the importance of adaptability and 
imagination in its officers.  As of 2010, the United States is fighting in two violent 
counterinsurgencies concurrently.  While there is reason to believe that 
counterinsurgencies, those following externally forced regime change, will not likely 
occur in the next dozen or so years, the concepts involved in counterinsurgency, 
especially those pertaining to stability operations, will have permanent importance as 
long as weak or unstable states are believed to be a continuing threat to global security.  
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates predicted, 
Repeating an Afghanistan or an Iraq--forced regime change followed by 
nation-building under fire--probably is unlikely in the foreseeable future.  
What is likely though, even a certainty, is the need to work with and 
through local governments to avoid the next insurgency, to rescue the next 
failing state, or to head off the next humanitarian disaster.  
Correspondingly, the overall posture and thinking of the United States 
armed forces has shifted away from solely focusing on direct American 
military action, and towards new capabilities to shape the security 
environment in ways that obviate the need for military intervention in the 
future.154 
 
Therefore the political lessons of the Algerian War will be of continued importance even 
after the conclusion of the violent counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and even 
if extremely similar examples to not replicate themselves for years to come.  Specifically, 
the observed importance of cultural awareness, the role and importance of mass 
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perception of the host-nation's populace, and the methods by which counterinsurgent 
forces can obtain active cooperation from host-nation civilians are of heightened 
importance. 
 The context of the Algerian War, itself a lesson for American strategists, 
demonstrates the importance of cultural awareness and perception to counterinsurgent 
forces.  The failure of the French to meet the aspirations of the moderate Algerian 
precluded the primary objective from being achieved.  This example is highlighted by 
the concurrent French military victory.  The primacy of politics in counterinsurgency 
was unearthed by the military success of the French.  Furthermore, using the logic that 
counterinsurgency is primarily a political endeavor, the nature of military operations 
and intelligence gathering methods of the Algerian War also became extremely 
important to the United States military.  During the Algerian War, torture, which was 
heavily debated at the time, led to observable results which have since been interpreted 
by the American military as counterproductive, though there is still debate on the 
question.  
  In the context of a political war, in which convincing is just as important as 
coercing, methods that can alienate the very population that the counterinsurgent forces 
strive to win over are counterproductive to that end.  This logic leads to the conclusion 
that all military operations must be analyzed for their psychological effect on the 
population.  As this thesis has argued, such examples were conspicuously played out 
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during the Algerian War and American military literature reflects that they incorporated 
these lessons. 
 This exceptional example in counterinsurgency history, therefore, commanded 
the attention of American military leaders who have since been scrambling for better 
ways to combat contemporary insurgencies since the Iraq insurgency in 2003.  The U.S. 
Army/ U.S. Marine Corp Counterinsurgency Field Manual confirms this link as it includes 
several direct citations from the Algerian War and its perhaps most significant 
participant, David Galula.  While U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine obviously has many 
foundational sources it cannot be denied that the Algerian War offers its own unique 






























Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. New York and London: 
 Frederick A. Praeger, 1964 
 
Hooker, Gregory. Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Role of Military 
 Intelligence Assessments. Washington D.C.: Institute for Near East Policy, 2005 
 
Maran, Rita. Torture: The Role of Ideology in the French Algerian War. New York:  Praeger, 
 1989 
 
Nagle, Lt. Col. John . Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 
 Malaya and Vietnam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005 
 
Roberts, Hugh. “The Image of the French Army in the Cinematic Representation of the 
 Algerian War: the Revolutionary Politics of the Battle of Algiers”. The Algerian War 
 and the French Army, 1954-62. ed. Martin Alexander, Martin Evans and J Keigler. 
 New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002  
 
Ucko, David. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern 
 Wars. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009 
 
Westmoreland, Gen. David. “Westmoreland Reflects on a War of Attrition.” Major 
 Problems in the History of the Vietnam War. ed. McMahon, Robert. New York and 
 Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003  
 
 
Journal and Magazine Articles 
 
Celli, Carlo. “Gillo Pontecorvo's Return to Algiers by Gillo Pontecorvo”. Film Quarterly, 
 vol. 58, No. 2 (Winter, 2004-2005)  
 
Gourevitch, Phillip. “Winning and Losing”. The New Yorker. December 22, 2003 
 
Klawans, Stuart. “Film; Lessons of the Pentagon's Favorite Training Film”. New York 





Rainer, Peter. “Prescient Tense: Re-creating the carnage of fifties Algeria—bombings, 
 assassination, police torture-- The Battle of Algiers is as relevant today as it was 
 in 1965.”  New York (magazine) (January 12, 2004) (web accessed) < 
 http://nymag.com/nymetro/movies/reviews/n_9697/> 
 
Ucko, David. “Innovation or Inertia: The U.S. Military and the Learning of 
Counterinsurgency” Orbis. Spring, 2008  
 
Zeytoonian, Dan “Intelligent Design: COIN Operations and Intelligence Collection and 





Tactics in Counterinsurgency. (FM 3-24.2) Headquarters: Department of the Army. April, 
 2009. 
 
The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
 Press, 2009 
 
“From Algeria to Iraq: All but Forgotten Lessons from Nearly 50 Years Ago.” RAND 
 Review, Summer, 2006. 
 
 
Military Review “Special Edition: Counterinsurgency Reader” Combined Arms Center, 
 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas October 2006 
 
Long, Austin. On “Other War:” Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency 
 Research. RAND Corporation (2006) 
 
David Gompert, Stuart Johnson, Martin Libicki, David Frelinger, John Gordon, 
 Raymond Smith and Camille Sawak. Underkill: Scalable Capabilities for Military 
 Operations Amid Populations. RAND research document, 2009 
 
Maj. Justin Gage, Maj. William Martin, Maj. Tim Mitchell, Maj. Pat Wingate. Winning the 
 Peace in Iraq: Confronting America's Informational and Doctrinal Handicaps. 
 Unspecified research paper for the Joint Forces Staff College's Joint and 
 Combined Warfighting School, September, 2003  
 




Goetzke, Karl. A Review of Algerian War of National Liberation Using the U.S. Army's 
 Current Counterinsurgency Doctrine. U.S. Army War College strategy research 
 project, March 2005 
 
Melnik, Constantin. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency In Algeria. RAND Corporation 
 (1964) 
 
Millen, Raymond. The Political Context Behind Successful Revolutionary Movements. Three 
 Case Studies: Vietnam (1955-63) Algeria (1945-62) and Nicaragua (1967-79). U.S. 
 Government publication by the Strategic Studies Institute. (web accessed) 
 <www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/> (2008) 
 
Petraeus, David and Amos, James. U.S. Army/ U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
 Manual. Published by the Headquarters of the Department of the Army. (2006) 
 
 
Academic Reports, Theses and Dissertations 
 
Detreux,  Kenneth. Contemporary Counterinsurgency (COIN) Insights From the French 
 Algerian War (1954-1962). Thesis presented to U.S. Army War College.  
 (March 2008) 
 
Norton, Maj. Jason. The French-Algerian War and FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency: A 
 Comparison. Thesis presented to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
 College. (February 2007) 
 
Riggs, LCDR Robert. Counter-Insurgency Lessons from the French-Algerian War. Final 
 Report presented to the Naval War College, September, 2004.  
 
Rotzien, Colonel Chad. Fighting a Global Insurgency Utilizing Galula's Counterinsurgency 
Warfare Theory. Thesis presented to the U.S. Army War College. (March 2007) 
 
Vrooman, Major Steven. A Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan Concept: The Galula Compass. 
 Thesis presented to the United Army Command and General Staff College. (May 










Kaufman, Michael. “What Does the Pentagon See in the 'Battle of Algiers'” New 
 York Times, September 7, 2003, pg. WK3 
 
Hunter, Steven. “The Pentagon's Lessons from Reel Life” Washington Post. September 4, 




PierNico Solinas, Introduction to the published screenplay of Gillo Pontecorvo's Battle of 
 Algiers. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1973) 
 
The Battle of Algiers. Directed by Pontecorvo, Gillo. Casbah Films, Inc. 1966. DVD  







Bowden, Mark. Black Hawk Down: A story of Modern War. Penguin Books, 2000. 
 
Connelly, Matthew. A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the 
 Origins of the Post-Cold War Era. Oxford University Press, 2002 
 
Evans, Martin and Phillips, John. Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed. New Haven and 
 London: Yale University Press, 2007 
 
Fall, Bernard. Last Reflections on a War. New York: Stackpole Books, 2000 
 
Gillespie, Joan. Algeria: Revolution and Rebellion. London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1960 
 
Herring, George. America's Longest War: The United States in Vietnam, 1950-1975. Second  
 ed. McGraw Hill, 1986 
 
Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. United States of America: 







Joes, Anthony. Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency. Lexington, 
 Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 2004 
 Keith Booth. Strategy and Ethnocentrism. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 
 Inc., 1979 
 
Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big 
 One.  Oxford University Press, Inc., 2009 
 
Mandel, Robert.  The Meaning of Military Victory. Boulder, London: Lynn Rienner 
 Publishers, 2006  
 
Martin Alexander, Martin Evans and J.F.V. Keiger. The Algerian War and the French Army. 
 Palgrave McMillan, 2002 
 




McDougal, James. History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2006 
 
Moyar, Mark. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency From the Civil War to Iraq. 
 London: Yale University Press, 2009 
 
Ottaway, David and Marina. Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution. Berkeley and Los 
 Angeles: University of California Press, 1970 
 
Polk, William. Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency,Terrorism and Guerrilla War from the 
 American Revolution to Iraq. New York: HarperCollins Books, 2007 
 
Quandt, William. Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968. The M.I.T. 
 Press, 1969 
 
Ruedy, Thomas. Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation. Boomington and 
 Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992  
 
Shepard, Todd. The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of 
 France. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006 
 
Talbott, John. The War Without a Nam: France in Algeria, 1954-1962. New York: Alfred A. 




Taber, Robert. The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Practice. New York: Lyle 
 Stuart, Inc., 1965 
 
Tse-tung, Mao. On Guerrilla Warfare trans. Samuel Griffith. Urbana and Chicago: 
 University of Illinios Press, 2000 
 
Thompson, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam. 
Palgrave McMillan, 1978 
 
Wall, Irwin. France, the United States and the Algerian War.  Berkeley, University of 




Hooker, R.D..  “Hard Day's Night: A Retrospective on the American Intervention in 
 Somalia.” Joint Forces Quarterly. Issue 54, 3rd Qtr, 2009 
 
 
Encyclopedias and Reference Works 
 






Coalition Military Operations: The Way Ahead Through Cooperability. Report of a French-
 German-UK-U.S. Working Group. 2000 (updated in 2010) 
